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A STUDY ON URBAN SECURITY IN THE MEDINA OF TUNIS

Adnen el Ghali
Yassine Turki
Ahlam Chemlali

DIGNITY
DANISH
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AGAINST TORTURE

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The present research was conducted by a team composed of:

- M. Adnen el Ghali, architect-urban planner, chief researcher, coordinator of the study

- Dr. Yassine Turki, lecturer-researcher, senior researcher

- Dr. Olfa Ben Medien, lecturer-researcher, in charge of quality review

- Mme. Souhir Bouzid, Doctoral researcher in urban planning, research assistant

- M. Mohamed Selim Ben Youssef, Doctoral researcher in political sciences, research assistant

- Dr. Aziza Ghram, lecturer, researcher, cartographer

- M. Mohamed Ben Othman, legal expert, expert in public security policies

DIGNITY - *Danish Institute Against Torture*

- Ahlam Chemlali, programme manager

Danish-Arab Partnership Programme

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Content

FOREWORD

The present study on urban security in the Medina of Tunis, was commissioned by Dignity - Danish Institute against Torture. The data was based on a qualitative survey on urban violence and security, with the Medina of Tunis as the selected field of investigation. The study aims at identifying means to develop concrete initiatives of community-based interventions and participatory activities involving a wide range of local actors, to prevent violence, improve security and its perceptions.

Thank you for the support and input from L'Art Rue, Beity and L'ASM.

ABSTRACT

- This study on urban security in the Medina of Tunis, commissioned by DIGNITY aims to outline the main aspects of urban violence and security in the Medina of Tunis and to design approaches for specific projects aimed at including the security issues in the programs and policies of local actors.

- The data is based on a qualitative survey conducted among a group of workers and inhabitants in the Medina, specifically the eastern side of the Medina. It focused on a qualitative analysis through focus group discussions and interviews.

- Spatial analysis provided characteristics regarding high density, honeycomb organization of narrow lanes, pedestrian density and activities. These features determine the perception of urban insecurity and control its manifestations. The territorial identification of insecurity shows variations according to locations and time. Social relationships appear as important explanatory variables for security conditions and perceptions.

- Young people of the Medina, who are excluded from other parts of the city and confined to under-serviced districts, are both perpetrators and themselves subjects to violence – from family, school, police – nonetheless also the key actors in making urban areas safer.

- The security rationale of both the police forces and the population, are fragmented and mainly based on a coded system and implied regulations, in a context where the presence of other public institutions is low, and their actions weak.

- Recommendations are made at the end of this study in the form of local policies to be implemented by the municipality of Tunis, especially focusing on improving socio-collective facilities, defining local policies of mobility and developing public spaces and working with the police and civil society. For DIGNITY, it is important to support these actors in their implementation of these recommendations. Finally, it is also recommended to conduct a quantitative study to produce a systematic knowledge on violence and security in Tunis.

1. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

1.1. Introduction

This study on urban security in the Medina of Tunis, commissioned by DIGNITY aims to outline the main aspects of urban violence and security in the Medina of Tunis and to design approaches for specific projects aimed at including the security issues in the programs of local actors.

1.2. Issues, questions and research progress

The research is mainly concerned with the manifestations of urban violence and the perception of insecurity. It aims to highlight local populations' perception and experience of urban violence, its impact on their citizen rights and how it affects their mobility, their access to services and facilities and the support they receive from the community and authorities. Data is also analyzed according to location.

The research intent is related to the specific context of the Medina of Tunis. It is an area of 270 hectares and 21400 inhabitants (INS 2014) at the center of an agglomeration of over 35000 hectares, an urban center of 2.5 million inhabitants. With its two districts, this historical center used to be the entire city of Tunis until the middle of the 20th century and was, during the last century, the subject of heavy processes of socio-spatial transformation. As a result, there is presently coexistence of: (i) an original population of Medina with a constantly decreasing number; these people own their homes; (ii) a resident population resulting from the different waves of rural migration; and (iii) a day-time population of workers in the various services established in the Medina and of more or less frequent visitors. These dynamics lead to wonder about the evolution of social ties and their relation to security. The role of young people and women in these systems and the way they relate to the area are also key questions for understanding the perceptions and the rationale on which they rest.

Although the central position of the Medina ensures closeness to the main urban transportation system and socio-collective facilities, its urban features lead to the situation where, at micro level, it is likely to generate some forms of exclusion for some categories of the population. The urban features are: (i) predominantly pedestrian (offering limited access to means of transportation); (ii) highly dense (and therefore hardly receptive of new projects of socio-collective facilities according to the usual strategies of public institutions);and (iii) dwellings where maintenance is difficult to perform. In terms of security, difficulty of access to motor-powered means of transportation, high density, functional specialization and the decrease of the residential function for the benefit of business (and therefore it is a ghost city in some places at night, Sundays and holidays) create a local environment likely to shape people's perception of insecurity.

This research is furthermore concerned with analyzing the way by which the particular features of the Medina contribute to the manifestations of urban insecurity - experienced or felt–and interact

with the other determining factors of urban insecurity. The research also addresses the mobility issue, always by connecting the urban configuration and their consequences in the mobility context, with the occurrences of violence and insecurity.

While addressing the issue in the context of the Medina as a socio-spatial unit, the research will focus on the eastern side of the Medina, to analyze the population's perceptions and practices. The selection of the site also rests on the social mix and its impact in terms of social and economic reintegration of vulnerable populations.

At the beginning of the research several questions were raised:

- What are the manifestations of urban insecurity and violence in the Medina of Tunis?

- How are these manifestations distributed over time and space?

- How does the urban design of the Medina contribute to security?

- How do these factors take shape in the eastern part of the Medina?

- In this part of the Medina, how is insecurity perceived by the different categories of the population, especially by men and young people?

- How does such perceptions affect people's practices and life experience?

- How are peoples mobility organized?

- Does the security situation affect mobility practices and access to services and local facilities?

- How do people reason in their fight against the risk of insecurity?

- What are the modes of action of the public, private actors and associations in the field of security?

- How are the needs of local populations integrated?

- What are the channels of communication?

Research methodology elements:

• Literature review to gather the general urban security issues based on comparative studies and surveys carried out in Tunisia. The analysis aims to (i) place the research questions in the overall debate of urban violence, (ii) identify the approaches and conclusions of previous case studies on the subject and (iii) identify the main findings of surveys and studies carried out in Tunisia and related to the present topic.

• Analysis of the genesis, progress and present functioning of the studied location, and of its socio-spatial organization; tracing inhabitants' residential migrations; identifying the nature of users of the site (workers, visitors, customers).

• Organizing a first workshop with experts, inhabitants and Medina specialists, along with a number of interviews with experts in urban and security issues in order to inform the first questions and pave the way for future investigations.

- Conducting a number of qualitative field investigations aimed at:

    i.   Restoring understanding and inhabitants' perceptions (with a focus on young people and women) of the meaning of violence and urban insecurity, their manifestations and impact on people's practices and their perception of available (or unavailable) opportunities to be involved in public and political life in their communities.

    ii. Identifying the economic, social, cultural, security, urban and political factors likely to favor or hinder respondents' mobility, their relationship to the city, and their access to services; using various variables to analyze the reasons, the sources and the arguments for urban practices and mobility in the city in the light of security priorities (analyze practices of mobility and of public space use).

    iii. Examining individual and community practices in facing security risks and the strategies towards institutional actors and other local actors.

    iv. Identifying policies and action mechanisms of institutional actors regarding security but also to mobility and public facilities and services. These investigations rested on interviews with around 40 people (residents, shopkeepers and employees in the Medina) and 5 focus groups. The qualitative nature of the survey techniques used, allowed for understanding the rationales and practices.

1.3. Overview of urban security

The concept of urban security is an interesting subject of analysis. If the city is primarily defined as a space for humans' exchange and activity, security immediately emerges as an essential element for the urban model to operate. Globally, violence costs 13.3% of world productivity (*The Commonwealth* 2017).

Issues related to urban security often appear as common features between cities; French suburbs and US ghettos share some common features, including rising juvenile delinquency and drugs, (Body Gendrot 1998), despite a few differences between cities. The focus is often placed over so-called sensitive (Bui-Trong 1993) or popular districts. Whereas security in cities used to be regarded as a social issue, or even of public health (Dahlberg 2002), it has now become eminently political. For public authorities, the fight against insecurity becomes less a problem than a solution (Muchielli 2008). After social responses, the issue is increasingly part of public security (Ajbali 1998) and is strongly endorsed by public authorities. City politics in France for example emerged following urban riots in the so-called 'sensitive' districts.

If it is accepted that the field of security is generally sovereign competence, the urban connection of the issue requires:

- to take several dimensions into account (social, territorial, institutional)

- to integrate several local actors whether institutional or not, and

- to add multiple levels of thought, from the national strategies supported by governments and legal and police bodies (including the authorities in charge of urban planning, youth, immigration), to local policies supported by elected representatives, to civil society organizations' action, and to forms of community action.

In research, many studies are conducted on the real and perceived cost, as well as on the consequences of urban violence. These studies are segmented and divided over many disciplines and some geographical contexts and do not sufficiently address the connection between urban poverty and urban violence (Brender 2012, Derks 2012) although it is often observed that security risks are likely to increase in low income areas. Case studies also show the importance of social variables (age, sex) and of poverty and inequality in the inclination to violence. These are added to living conditions and to relationships with local governments and with law (Chemlali 2017, Dignity 2016, Dignity 2015). When there are political or ethnic tensions at the local level, conflict management in districts is closely linked to national political tensions and even to regional and geopolitical dynamics as it is the case in Beirut (*The Knowledge Platform Security &Rule of Law* 2015). A high level of social cohesion characterizes each group there allowing a plural security and a decrease of risk factors resulting from crime and disorder.

Violence is contagious and can be prevented (*The Commonwealth* 2017). Therefore, acting to improve security is an important challenge. In terms of approach, the four-level socio-ecological model explores the complex interaction between individual, relational, community and societal factors (WHO 2002) and leads to capturing the complex interrelation between these dimensions. As far as methods of action, inhabitants' involvement can contribute to decrease crime in districts and can be regarded as one of the main paths for action. Civil society involvement is also a means to help institutions fill their mandates (Body Gendrot 1998). There is also practical non-institutional social action for social life development in public and semi-public spaces of urban areas in crisis, implemented by actors who provide support to people in social difficulty (Baillergeau 2008). Local and non-state actors often play a key role in the field of justice and security in many fragile countries and in post-conflict contexts. These approaches risk however creating parallel structures, lack of human rights and lack of sustainability (Derks 2012).

Examining the question of urban security immediately places mobility at the heart of the issue. It is a matter here of people's daily mobility. Indeed, residence mobility considers the issue under other angles which are those of the effect of migration on security and vice versa and of the degradation of security and its influence on the choices and practices of residence migration. It also considers the issue in other spheres of analysis: the socio-spatial segregations resulting from processes of population redistribution and of accumulation of the poorest in determined areas, and the role of the State in imposing mobility to the poor, depriving them of their local resources (Fol 2009).

There are two levels of analysis:

- The potential for connecting urban areas and the potential for population mobility. Poor access to transportation networks is likely to confine the poorest and most vulnerable among the populations to their residence areas. This is likely to reduce the ripple and integration effect by the other urban functions available in the center and other areas of the city, increasing security risks within the residence areas themselves. The mobility potential is not equally distributed among the population of any given area and depends upon the independent means available, and the potential for psychomotricity, for reading space and for respecting social time and standards (Le Breton 2006). This leads to discovering fragmented spaces where the most vulnerable populations are 'insulated'. Vicious circles appear where poverty implies less access to city opportunities, generating more exclusion and marginality (Orfeuil 2003).

- Mobility is a practice for which the security question is decisive. Security in the means of transportation is a determining factor of population mobility. This level of analysis is connected to the first in the way access to urban areas depends upon the security of the transportation provided.

1.4. Awareness of urban security and mobility in Tunis

Examining the issue of urban security in Tunisia today first requires returning to the socio-political balance which prevailed in the last decades before 2011. The regime in place rested on a « *'security pact' intended to ensure order and peace where seeking economic integration and permanent negotiation were fundamental dimensions* » (Hibou 2006) in addition to police and partisan control. With these mechanisms, *« the State attempted to prevent all uncertainty, risk, danger, and it did so with legitimacy since it was responding to State willingness from the population, willingness for protection, consumption and modernity* » (Hibou 2011).

After 2011, socio-political upheavals occurred along with a decline in the capacity of the State to ensure security to all citizens (PSI 2016, Clingedael 2015). Community or citizen practices emerged since 14 January 2011 trying to fill the void which State withdrawal has left with spontaneous neighborhood protection committees. The committees however, failed to make up for State withdrawal. They quickly disappeared or were prolonged by groups with political connotation (leagues for protecting the revolution). At the same time, salafist groups in working class districts tried to control the public space.

International Crisis Group report (2015) highlights the dysfunctions of the domestic security machinery and its difficulty to cope with growing jihadist violence, with attacks in Tunis and Sousse, in March and June 2015, and the frequent attacks against the police, the National Guard and the army demonstrating the significant breakthrough of radical islamist groups. According to this study, the authorities «*have difficulty countering this threat and developing public security policy*» as a combination of internal reasons to security forces and regional context. The study calls for reforming domestic security forces to avoid crisis management on a case-by-case basis. This reform would be coupled with urban and cultural actions. But despite the inability of the State to appropriately meet the security demands and the need for reform, Tunisia « *currently has sufficient social and political resources to counter the emergence of a plural security offer »* (PSI 2016)

and the effect of the revolution of 2011 and the transition phase which followed it, the security gaps in Tunisia are still persistent, generally in the working-class districts of Greater Tunis.

Some empirical studies have tried to take the investigations further, especially among young people and women. The analysis conducted on school violence (Paye 2006) highlights the importance of symbolic violence by the educational institution, the weakness of the concept of school justice, the absence of collective action and the 'burn-out' of educational staff. The study also points out that in the case of under-privileged populations, there is the broader question of social, economic and political violence in society where the first victims are the discriminated groups and their children whose vulnerability is consequently enhanced.

Other case studies carried out in Tunisia highlighted the risky sexual behavior of young people and the fact that one in five young people was victim of physical violence, and one in four committed it, more so outside family sphere[1] (MST/SIDA 2014); violence[2] against women in the public sphere involves one woman out of two[3] (Credif 2016). The sociologic survey conducted in the urban districts of Ettadhamen and Douar Hicher (Lamloum 2015) pointed out the overlap of stigmatization and exclusion that add to violence, in a context where relationship with public institutions is problematic.

1.5. Radicalization and the emergence of new forms of violence

Violent radicalization in Tunisia mainly affects young people; these are the young people described by the World Bank as the 33% Neet *(not in education, nor in employment, nor in training)*. According to a study commissioned by the Tunisian center of research and study of terrorism (CTRET) and developed from a sample of 1000 terrorist and 384 court cases submitted between 2011 and 2015, 75% of terrorism prisoners are in the 18-34 age group[4] and 90% are under 40, while 40 % went to university. This leads to discarding the idea that those without education are the most likely to be recruited as the radicalized in Tunisia, like their fellow citizens, have access to higher education.

The role played by social media and by the radicalization tools, which extremist networks use, is essential. Over 46% of those charged for terrorism have been influenced by works on religion, 11% were enlisted on internet, while only 3% by the media (newspapers, television, radio). In addition to social networks, the socialization sphere ranged from preaching in tents put up outdoors, to preaching in prisons, high schools, universities, mosques, public areas and sports associations.

In some urban areas, vice squads emerged following the Saudi State institution *Al-Amr Bil Maâroufwa Nahy Al-Monkar* (to promote virtue and prevent vice), whose name was included

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1   During the year preceding the survey.
2   Psychological violence at 78%, sexual at 75% and physical at 48%.
3   During the four years preceding the survey.
4   http://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/tunisie-hamza-meddeb-%C2%AB-la-montee-de-la-radicalisa-tion-n-est-pas-liee-a-la-democratisation-%C2%BB--7021

in an application file to create an association in Tunisia in February 2012[5]. Violent commitment is part of a severance approach particularly in some areas like the working-class districts of Greater Tunis and some inner regions of the country. Tunis and Ariana then had the highest number of terrorists between 2011 and 2015, respectively 181 and 61 while Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine and Jendouba had 138, 52 and 53.

Confronted with such complex situation and with its consequences on the ground, the Tunisian State must pay the price of the lack of a national strategy to fight the risk of a jihadist threat. Indeed, *« although determined to address this security challenge, the authorities have not yet implemented any multidimensional strategy to address the causes of this violence (prevention) and significantly improve law enforcement agencies (anticipation, coordination, reaction, adaptation) »*. Understanding the genesis and mode of operation of the radicalization process is incomplete and none of the strategic documents developed in 2014 and 2015, have been published. Besides, response to radicalization and violent extremism stems from a security standpoint and is incident-driven[6]. Indeed « *no strategy going beyond security in the strict sense (defense, interior, justice), with systems likely to be improved according to their impact on the ground, has been made public to date, and especially applied* »[7]. This exposes the weakness of State response to a growing threat which requires involving other various actors to provide response in all the threatened locations. The underlying causes of social injustice, violence and police humiliation are harnessed by jihadist groups who mainly target young people from rural and suburban deprived areas. However, because these questions relate to good governance, to economic and social rights and to social justice, they are not included in the analysis of the situation and in its management.

The response of the Tunisian State to terrorist threat in 2013-2014 consisted in creating bodies essentially under the ministries of defense, justice and the interior; eloquent selection in terms of designing the necessary response (*International Crisis Group* 2016).

In view of the governing institutions of these many bodies, it clearly appears that the security lever is the only one to have been activated and that no extensive work of prevention, education, and community-level monitoring has yet been undertaken. No tool has yet been developed to help individuals likely to fall into 'violent extremism' (El Difraoui 2017), aiming at identifying 'risk' groups, assess the nature and gravity of the risk, and develop the most appropriate measures to support those concerned.

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5   http://www.kapitalis.com/proximite/53-societe/8625-tunisie-les-tunisiennes-seront-elles-con-traintes-de-se-couvrir-les-yeux-.html & http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/national/8401-tunisie-legalisation-dune-milice-islamique-sous-le-couvert-dune-association.html After a first rejection, the association changed the name and adopted 'Al-Jamia al-Wassatia Li-TawiaWal-Islah'' (Centrist Association for awareness and reform).

6   This sectoral response and its adverse effects in terms of efficiency was underlined by DCAF : « a comprehensive capacity building strategy for combating violent extremism cannot be limited to a military counter-terrorism assistance. » The role of good governance of the security sector in coun-tering violent extremism in the MENA region, February 2015 , http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org//adminD-caf/upload/ejournal/documentfr_10219.pdf

7   See the report « Reform and security strategy in Tunisia », *Crisis Group report Middle East/North AfricaN°161*, 23 July 2015

1.6. Local governance and security

According to the organic law of municipalities[8], «*under the national development plan* », communities« *take part in the economic, social and cultural promotion of the town*». In their operating mode, towns provide for the creation of eight standing committees, none of which includes the issue of security or dialogue. However, article 76 of this law stipulates that the president of the municipal council is responsible, under the governing authority, for the implementation of the laws and regulations in the town and of general security measures. Article 81 introduces municipal regulations which concern a whole range of subjects including security, peaceful public environment and the prevention of accidents and evil. The president of the municipality fills functions according to municipal regulations whereas security employees implement his rulings through orders.

While the texts have defined the prerogatives but limited municipal action in matters of security and linked their action to State bodies as far as decision taking (governing bodies) and implementation (security officers), field practice shows that towns take very little responsibility in this regard. Even management of internal road traffic escapes municipal practice. The role of towns in dialogues at the local level is absent in the texts and is not reported in practice. In the prerogatives of regional councils, which are the local authorities at the regional level there are more duties of coordination but geared towards development.

The country's commitment, since adopting the constitution of January 2014, to achieve decentralization does not include any transfer of security competences to local communities. On the contrary, municipal police is under the single authority of police structures and any request by mayors for law enforcement authority, even to report acts, must go through the chiefs of police stations.

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8   Law 75-33 of 14 May 1975

2. URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILITY

2.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to use the required concision for a study focused on contemporary aspects to provide a picture of urban development in the Medina of Tunis by highlighting urban morphology, the economic system and social morphology as well as population distribution and the richness of people's contributions along the ages.

The chapter presents current land occupancy, the result of various accumulated historical processes of socio-spatial transformation, particularly in the selected site of the survey, East side. It also describes the mobility system in this area.

Initially, there was this site: hills, rather low, between two lakes, *Sebkhet el Sijoumi*, salt lake, and *el Bouhaira*, lake covering marshy land surrounded by green meadows and overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. This site was selected for the construction of *Tarchich*, old name of the town, at the time of founding of Utica, first Poeniciancity in Africa in the 11th century BC.

The creation of Carthage, powerful neighbouring metropolis reduced Tunis to a modest peripheral urban center dependent on the capital, populated mainly by Libyan nomads living in makeshift camps.

The Roman imperial power was followed by a vandal kingdom (from the 5th to the 6th century) and the Byzantine empire (from the 6th to the 7th century) which left little impact on the site of Tunis which, after eighteen centuries of existence was no more than a modest town, closer to a nomadic camp than to a real urban center, dominated by a temple which once used to be sacred but which the Christianized population has no longer used since the 3rd century.

PLAN DE SITUATION DE TUNIS

Figure : site plan of Tunis in REVAULT Jacques, *Palaces and homes of Tunis (16th and 17th centuries),* Published by the National Center of Scientific Research, France, 1980.

2.2. Background of urban development in the Medina of Tunis

In the first half of the 19th century, the Medina of Tunis seemed immutable. Its imprint reflected the peak of its glory under the Hafisdes. The central part of the Medina consists of around one hundred hectares bordered West by the palatial and military complex of La Kasbah. It is flanked by two suburbs, (Bab Souika, 100 hectares) in the north and (Bab el Djezira, 70 hectares) in the south. They are separated from the central part by an inner wall inherited from the original Medina. The dense market network of souks has kept its special skills and the system of trade guilds is still operational away from the economic changes shaking Europe.

The market network of souks grows around the Great Mosque, the beating heart of the authorizing city, by its physical and symbolic size and economic activities, and is extended by a residential network.

It is the way the town planned privacy which makes room, in the cultural and economic heart of the town, for an urban development taking root in the 'sharia' (Van Staevel 2008), producing confined enclosed spaces. The dense residential fabric is crisscrossed by the main routes linking the city gates to the cultural heart. It consists of groups of patio houses along public facilities; *masjid* (oratory), *kottâb* (Koranic school), *médersa* (university institution), *hammâm* (Moorish bath), coffee houses, *koucha* (bakery), *fondouk* (hotel), *torbet* (funeral monument). They are all designed to make a district so that it is a city unit, the same as a parish (Freyy 2001). The alleys contribute to the privatization of space as they extend inside the patio homes through zigzag entrances– *driba*– which protect indoor privacy from the outside. This design is the expression of the clear separation between family and community order (Binous and Eckert 1980).

In addition to the main routes from the gates of the enclosure to the Great Mosque and the market quadrangle, the road network includes «ways out of the main routes leading to other gates without crossing the religious and business center. These are secondary courses which connect to the main routes and/or their accessways. They are lanes off the main and or secondary routes which connect the inner residential core to the linear area of the road network». (Binous et Eckert 1980).

Tunis is «*pre-industrial, pre-capitalist, pre-colonial and its urban organization, both social and spatial, was the subject between 1840 and 1881 – significant pivotal period in the course of its development – of the early major transformations putting an end to a millennial urban tradition*» (Abdelkafi, Ben Bechr, Binous 1985).

The traditional economic system was severely undermined by industrialized European manufacturing and the growing penetration of European manufactured products into the Tunisian market.

Despite beneficial impulses under *Hammouda Pasha* then *Ahmed Pasha,* the 19th century was the time of reversals. European diplomacy, that of consuls of nations, was so heavy that the Tunisian State had difficulty maintaining protectionist measures (Ganiage 1959).

The abolition of pirate raids, following the naval demonstration of Lord Exmouth, deprived the regency of considerable sources of income. European industries went as far as copying national items, competing thus with Tunisian products over in their own markets and in the traditional export markets. Tax collection records include many testimonies of the collapse of local craftsmanship with the closing of several businesses, degradation of many souks for lack of maintenance, decline in the number of active craftsmen, decline in their average income and increase of unpaid debts. The sector is now in sharp decline in terms of human and material ressources but it keeps fascinating travelers and wealthy gentlemen attracted from Europe by this welcoming country.

Charles Lallemand, French painter, sketched portraits of timeless craftsmen at the end of the 19th century where street morphology continued to reflect the social and economic picture of trades in urban language (Lallemand 1890). But the process of transformation was irrevocable and neither *Khair-Eddine*s reforms during his mandate of Grand-Vizir nor those introduced during the protectorate succeeded to undo the evil which befell handicraft and its urban habitus. The areas of production and of trade, the space for living and the art of living in the Medina were irrevocably affected.

The observed degradation of buildings, wreckages of houses, closed shops open sewers, piles of waste at the town entrance, migratory impact of famine over a miserable rural population joined by migrants from Sardinia, Sicily, Greece and Malta, all in crowded *fondouks* of the French quarter, required creating a form of administration controlling and organizing the city. The municipality of Tunis was created on 3 August 1858, one year after the fundamental pact promulgated under *Mohammed Bey* on 10 September 1857 following the Congress of Paris of 1856. It was the first document to guarantee the freedoms and equality of his subjects.

With the creation of this institution[9], the disastrous efforts under Ahmed Bey to modernize the country are extended and, through the newly-created commissions, they reinforced interference by consuls who represented foreign powers in Tunis and protected their nationals through consular court jurisdiction. Place de la Bourse, located in the heart of the French quarter, opposite Porte de France (*Bâb el Bahr*), moved there for the occasion, became the nerve center of the country causing a reversal of the operation axes of the city, which occurred at the expense of the north-south axis. The construction of the new French consular hotel at regency expense along the Marine promenade, outside central Medina, and inaugurated in 1860, announced the imbalances to come. It hosted guards, the post, railways, consulates (Greece's established opposite the French consular hotel in 1875), the central market, the port and warehouses. With the establishment of the protectorate it is the area between Porte de France and the lake which was registered and would serve as the foundation of the European city.

Tunis was divided in two. The colonial city kept developing along with the rising number of allotments, beyond the boulevards belt, in less crowded sites where suburbs were growing consisting of villa neighborhoods for Europeans. The avenue of the Marine became the main thoroughfare, attracting administrative and office buildings which competed with the historical center of the Medina and mainly the *Kasbah* and *BâbBnet* boulevard. For colonial authorities, the state of the Medina justified French presence and testified to the need for «order». Such interpretation reflecting the dogmas of colonial power's « civilizing mission », is exposed by Jacques Berque:

9   On urban power in Ottoman Tunis and the creation of the Municipality of Tunis, read : LAFI Nora (dir.), Mediterranean *municipalities. Ottoman urban reforms through a comparative history (Middle East, Maghreb, Southern Europe),* Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2005, 370 p., p.229-254.

« *Irrational, unreasonable or at least what seems so. So, does the Medina appear to its new occupants. So, does it appear, there where it is preserved, although, on our side, soldiers' mistrust and engineers' fear have turned respectively into urban planner's criticism and aesthete's excitement. What was dangerous has become « unhealthy » or « picturesque »* (Berque 1958).

The Medina was not left behind, and municipal attention focused on sanitation there; it was the natural outcome of the sanitary design which is still in force, starting with its Jewish quarter, the *Hâra*.

Major 20th century urban operations: Sanitation at the Hâra of Tunis

The Jewish population of Tunis obtained the right to a homeland[10] in the 10th-11th century as a privilege granted by the saint Mahrez Ibn Khalef, known to posterity as *Soltân el Médina* (Sultan of the city), who dedicated the north-eastern part of the city to Jews, with the right to build a *fondouk* for fifty families. The *Hara* was organized according to residential districts with souks, fondouks and baths, all structured around the Great Synagogue (Revault 1963)[11]. The arrival of Livornese Jews, called *Grâna*, fleeing persecutions, generated a housing problem leading to a gradual annexation of the *Hafsia* area throughout the 19th century. At the beginning of the 19th century, the *Hâra* was part of an area bordered by the Maltese *oukelas*, the street of *Djerbiens*, *Hafsia* and two red-light districts (*Abdallah Guech* and *el Baiane*) with uncertain limits. For Paul Sebag, the *Hara* is a ghetto (Sebag 1959), while «*sociological approaches and literary descriptions describe the same picture of a deprived urban environment, suffering from social pathology, an area of endemic and secular misery requiring sanitation through social development planning*» (Abdelkafi 1989).

The increasing poverty of the population living there led to a severe degradation of buildings while families who could afford it left the *Hâra* for good[12]. The space they left was soon filled by newcomers, even more destitute, among Christians and Muslims; this enhanced the picture of destitution and degradation which stuck to the area since the 1860's, not counting accommodation in one of the red-light districts (Larguèche 1999)[13].

The municipality, and then the central administration, developed a sanitation project of the Jewish districts (in truth demolition-construction works) from 1918 to 1939, which was in truth a housing construction project in the *Hâra* for family resettlement. The project included a first phase (from 1918 to 1928) of expropriation of dilapidated buildings turned into dumps in the heart of the *Hâra* to be replaced by sanitary housing. « *The sanitary operation consisted in demolishing the Hâra to renovate it, and not to repair existing houses to relieve the misery of the population* » (Abdelkafi 1989) while architectural formalism with the use of « Arabisance » style, seemed the only remedy facilitating integration in a traditional urban morphology. In the end, the project was carried out in 1936 and, due to the advanced state of disrepair, spared very few buildings and alleys. Four resettlement buildings were erected, including three four-storey buildings with business ground floor. They were around inner yards and offered housing for 400 Jewish families in apartments with running water, electricity and gas.

10   The Jewish population used to be confined to the peripheral area of el Mallasine.

11   The fondouk appears as one of the essential components in an area which attracts many immigrants (Andalucian Jews from Spain in the 17th century and Livornese Jews from Italy in the 18th century joined by a community of trading travelers.

12   The house of the Caïd of Jews Nessim Semmama is itself turned into a fondouk and settled by Jewish families.

13   LARGUECHE Abdelhamid. *Les ombres de la ville. Pauvres, marginaux et minoritaires à Tunis (17th and 19th centuries).* Manouba, 1999.

After the second world war, the sanitation project had very little support. The municipality was subject to criticism and had to admit its failure in the operation of the four resettlement buildings. The Commissioner for reconstruction and housing was involved and declared the *Hâra* unsanitary. A renovation area was approved by decree on 22 July 1954 and the municipality just released a loan of 10 million francs for home improvement (structural consolidation and strengthening) while the *Israelite Alliance* and the *Œuvre de secours à l'enfance (Children's Relief Work)* covered the costs for building a nursery, a clinic and a synagogue. Jewish migration towards the European part of the city continued according to community members' success. Thus, « *in 1949, the Tunis-Hara district still had 600 buildings, 3 000 families and 15 000 people, or half the Jewish population; in 1956, it had a little less than 8 000 inhabitants, while the Jewish population of Tunis was of 30 000 inhabitants* » (Cattan 2007).

El Kherba: A hole in the heart of El Maktar

The same district experienced another trauma in the gaping hole of Hafsia, to which was added the cavity caused by Allied bombing over the French district, at the location of the telegraphic station. This was the origin of the *Kherba* district, initially called *Mdaq El Halfa* located in the southern part of central Medina. This section, an open gap in the Medina, was in the past part of *El Maktar* district and was subject to initial demolitions caused by Allied bombings, aggravated by occasional demolitions leading to a cleared area of around 8000 m2 of unobstructed space at the heart of what used to be a dense area. It is located at the lower part of the Medina, along the ancient walls and was once close to the harbor and extended the French district which contained all its activities. During the 19th century, under the Protectorate, the *Kherba* kept a strong business character and strengthened its connection vocation between the Medina and the new part of the city. The presence of consular agencies and a telegraph service, and its closeness to the central market and to trading posts and shipping agencies reinforced the social mix of the district. It even harbored the first multi-faith school of the country (*Collège Saint-Louis*), located at Missionary alley. The school was founded by Abbé Bourgade (Gutron 2005), chaplain of Saint-Louis chapel (whose appointment was due to the solicitude of Émilie de Vialar, Mother Superior of the Sisters of Saint-Joseph, whom he had met in Algeria in 1838, while he was vicar at the cathedral of Algiers). In addition to the school, it had a French hospital (Saint-Louis hospital) housed in *Sidi Ali Azouz* barracks built under *Hammouda Pasha El Husseïni* (1781-1813) and spreading over 1500 m2. This main hospital completed a facility comprising another hospital, much smaller, and located nearby, at Bon Secours street. The area also contained large aristocratic homes like *Dar Beyram Turki*, built in the early 17th century in a hafside style still in vogue at the time and covering 885 m2 (Akrout-Yaiche, Bejaoui, Guezzah, Mouhli 2012). This area, now the largest parking space in the Medina, was declared in 1954 « priority [development] zone ».

Central Medina at the dawn of independence

At independence proclamation on 20 March 1956, the Medina was« a ghetto for Muslims »according to an expression by Fatma Ben Bechr. There were very few Muslims who could afford to settle in the European part of the city, and even fewer settled in the single Muslim suburbs of *Tawfiq* and *El Omrane*. The Medina was getting denser and migrant rural populations, in search of a better life, and not finding housing in the overcrowded Medina or in the European part of the city, forbidden to the natives, started, following the Second World War, creating gourbis on the immediate outskirts of the city. These pockets of informal housing did not stop growing and, along with the Medina of Tunis, as will be seen further, started a complex relation of population transfer. Rural emigration indeed began since the 1930's and consisted of flows of proletarized rural people who progressively replaced local bourgeoisie.

In 1968, 2/3 of the heads of households in the Medina were born outside Tunis and 1/4 of the dwellings were occupied by 4 to 12 households each with an average of 4 persons per room. This high density (average of 520 inhab/ha) caused a degradation of buildings. When the Medina became the privileged destination of rural economic emigrants, its economy changed completely. The old part of town became an extended popular economic center serving the rural population of the entire Tunis. The residential part deteriorated due to over densification and the introduction of production and business areas inside the very homes (Daoulatli, Binous, Lesage 1982).

The process of recovering national sovereignty resulted in a « tunisification » of the population of the country and of its economy. The European population was particularly targeted and, through a number of administrative measures, invited to leave the country. Hence, the foreign population moved from 160 000 people to 25 000 within ten years (1956-1966) while the social mix increased with the arrival of populations from the inner regions of the country. In 1976, 41 % of Tunis inhabitants were from the Haut Tell area (Beja, Jendouba, Le Kef, Siliana), 19% from the north-east (Zaghouan, Bizerte, Nabeul), 17 % from the Sahel (Sousse, Mahdia, Sfax, Monastir) and 15 % from the central part (Kairouan, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid) while people from the south (Gabès, Gafsa, Medenine) only represented 8% of the population (Abdelkafi, Ben Bechr, Binous 1985).Such a disruption of the social and demographic composition was not without effect on the city. The strong dichotomy between the Medina and the European part of the city was enhanced to a point where the Medina was referred to as the « *antithesis of the European city* » (Escher, Schepers 2008). The Medina as« Muslim ghetto »under the Protectorate, lost a major part of its wealthy population. Aristocracy and bourgeoisie flocked to the apartments and villas of residential districts, leaving their homes and leading to the disappearance of the patriarchal occupancy model of the family homes which used to be protected by the system of land endowments (*Habous*). These homes, abandoned without qualms or scruples in order to endorse the trendy art of living and achieve social climb, were rented room by room to underprivileged migrants from rural areas who occupied them, almost like gourbis. Patios, central living spaces, could not be used by the tenant families who did not know each other, and became walk-throughs to avoid promiscuity. The process of turning the old town into a slum was underway. While the State, was eradicating gourbis around the country by outright elimination of slums, in the Medina however, homes and monuments were turning into *oukelas*[14].

With independence also, breakthrough projects of the Hâra were back on the agenda under cover of modern extremism intending to do away with the past completely and to focus on novelty. Demolition works resumed in 1961-1962 in the Hâra district which, once cleared, gave way to an extended space. It was rapidly filled by second hand dealers of all sorts and displays of the destroyed Souk el Hout. A renovation project supported by Bulgarian technical cooperation, was initiated by the municipal administration, and implementation began: two schools, a youth club and a social center were built between 1964 and 1968. An unsuccessful market project gave way to a flea market. Brutal demolition and reconfiguration of Sidi el Béchir district in Bab Djezira suburb in 1967 nearly ended in insurrection against the authorities and marked the end of large-scale decontextualized operations when the Association to Safeguard the Medina of Tunis (ASM) was created. It serves to reflect the impact of economic socialist planning on ruler mindsets.

14   The practice of renting rooms to more than 4 unrelated households, led to an over-densification of dwellings and, in consequence, accelerated their degradation. The process was called « oukalization » by ASM teams who studied this type of housing. The word *oukala* originally referred to a boarding house where rent was for a week or a few days by single men looking for work in town and were historically areas for production and storage of goods, where craftsmen lived. The historical oukalas were the first buildings in the Medina where single rooms were rented to entire families.

2.3. Land use and urban projects

Many projects started in the Medina of Tunis which have shaped its current form.

LA HAFSIA - Restructuring a rundown district

After it experienced demolition begun in 1919, followed by two waves of demolition-reconstruction in the 1930's, linked to decisions on the *Hâra*, the Hafsia district was the object of a restructuring project in two phases over an area of 13.5 hectares.

A first phase of construction was achieved between 1972 and 1975 over 100 patio houses and around one hundred shops, breaking with traditional urban morphology and displaying orthogonal streets and vertical construction. The project was led by the Association to Safeguard the Medina (ASM) of Tunis which carried out the study and revealed the extent of the process of slum growth. Consequences on the closest surroundings were less glamorous. Indeed, once the first phase had ended, the districts of *Sidi Younes* and *Sidi el Baian* experienced respectively 56% and 47% labor unemployment or under-employment and household income was well below minimum wage. Finally, 21% of the households of *Sidi Younes* and 10% of those of *Sidi el Baian* owned their homes while 9% and 14% respectively were squatters[15].

This first phase received the Aga Khan Architecture reward in 1983 and was followed by the second which was on an integrated project. Again, ASM carried out the study while the municipality was the project owner and ARRU (Agency of urban rehabilitation and renovation) was the deputy controller. Refurbishing existing buildings after decreasing densification was among the objectives to provide each family with an independent living space of $40m_2$ with one watering place at least and a kitchen. The rehabilitation process raised however an important legal problem related to blocked rent and tenant fixed occupancy of the premises.

At the urban level, the *Hafsia* project was designed to guarantee urban homogeneity between the old fabric and the restructured one surrounding it. It also succeeded to regenerate the district's business activities, to replace or rehabilitate many of the crumbling dwellings and to promote exchange among residents from different social backgrounds.

The success of the operation was also largely due to ASM local belonging as it assisted the deputy project owner in facilitation and mediation and implemented the necessary modifications and minor changes *in situ*[16].

Globally, the construction of 400 houses in addition to 107 shops and 24 offices allowed resettling a large number of families' victims of demolition, initiating a new feature of rehabilitating old buildings, and drawing attention to the evil effect of legislation governing relationships donors/tenants, managing agents, joint ownership, etc.[17]

15   BARDOS Anna, http://web.mit.edu/akpia/www/AKPsite/4.239/hafsia/hafsia.html
16   However, the extent and the long period of the project (14 million dinars over nearly 12 years) did not encourage decision makers to extend the operation at Ras Ed-Darb, another area of urban re-structuring in the Medina.
17   AKROUT-YAÎCHE Samia, BEJAOUI Faika, GUEZZAH Abdelkrim, MOUHLI Zoubeïr, *Tunis Patrimoine Vivant. Conservation et créativité. Association de Sauvegarde de la Médina (1980 - 2012),* editions of the Association to Safeguard the Medina, Tunis, 2012, 280 pages.

Similarly, action carried out under this project included installation and renewal of various systems (sanitation, drinking water, gas, public lighting), paving, and the construction of a few public facilities including a clinic, a kindergarten, a Moorish bath and a facility for waste collection[18]. These facilities complemented the few achievements since independence although users kept complaining about the lack of playgrounds for children and of parks. Strong nuisances, especially as noise, are denounced, as well the traffic jams on the roads flooded with cars. According to local officials however, delinquency has sharply fallen, and security was under control (Akrout Yaiche 1994). It is true that the question of security and control in the Medina was already raised under the French Protectorate. But it took all its meaning during the events of« black Thursday » which was on 25 January 1978. The general strike ordered by the central trade union (UGTT), led to a hostile media campaign against the government and the main union leaders found themselves surrounded by the security forces and trapped at Union HQ, on *Mohammed Ali* Square, near Maltais street (now Mongi Slim street). According to one version of facts, insurrection broke out from the Medina after a shot was fired in the vicinity of the old town followed by stones thrown by some young people on roofs. The police having not reacted, for some unknown reasons, it was the army which responded with force and brutality. The official toll reported 46 dead and 325 wounded (Le Soult, Rollinde 1999).

THE OUKALAS –Sanitation of unhealthy housing

As early as 1970, studies carried out by ASM had revealed a problem of insecure and over-densified unhealthy housing in the Medina, especially in its central part. At that time, the city was experiencing intense population renewal; city families from the old town were leaving it, and rural low-income immigrants were settling in and enjoying the favorable welcoming structure, with the large empty patio houses much suitable for renting by room. This practice was in fact indirectly supported by the State which had started a vigorous process of slum eradication without offering any alternatives.

So, disregarding the inadequacy of the premises, and compelled by need, the makeshift tenants shared toilets, kitchens, and watering places in doubtful condition. «*Renting a single room was in fact the only option for these often-large families with one or two active members at most* » (Akrout Yaiche 2002). A study by ASM in the late 1980's revealed the existence of more than 600 *oukalas* housing 3000 households (around 15000 people). Promiscuity, unsafe behavior and unhealthy surroundings were the everyday life features of these populations exposed to degrading living conditions against a background of high crime. In 1990, when a *oukala* collapsed, fearing loss of human lives, the authorities were led to take measures. The project benefited from political support after the surprise visit by the president of the republic. In collaboration with various public authorities, a large-scale survey showed that two thirds of low income *oukala* residents (income not exceeding 200 dinars a month) were distributed as follows: around 120 elderly people lived alone with no family. Around 30% of these families were headed by single women (widowed, divorced, separated or with a husband in jail). *Oukala* residents belonged to low income social classes. The other third of residents had average income (between 250 and 400 dinars a month). Large families were the majority (5 persons and above)[19]. A major initiative was finally taken to reduce housing insecurity and was maintained until the early 2000 when it became a 4-phase project with multiple aspects: resettlement of the most vulnerable groups in new dwellings provided by the municipality; de-densification and upgrading to housing standards of dwellings which were to keep their tenants; rehabilitation assistance to private individuals through loans to owners using them; and finally restoration of many significant historical buildings which formally served as *oukalas*.

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18   Website of Tunis Commune : http://www.commune-tunis.gov.tn/publish/content/article.asp?id=199

19   Website of Tunis Commune : http://www.commune-tunis.gov.tn/publish/content/article.asp?ID=198&idDiv=7

The «Oukalas» project attracted key institutions concerned with housing problems, including, ASM, the municipal social department, ARRU, and various public service concession holders.

In seven years (1991-1997), the Municipality of Tunis succeeded to resettle, in three phases and on its own land, over 2000 households after emergency evacuation from 366 buildings threatening to collapse. The new homes were conceded to the beneficiaries who were to become owners; an exceptional opportunity to an unqualified population to the available system of access to social housing. From tenants, these households became owners of 42m^2 homes over 80m^2 pieces of land with possible extension to an upper floor. These dwellings were rented for sale, with no interest, over a period of 25 years (monthly repayment of around 32 to 40 dinars). It is nevertheless important to note that although some *oukala* residents were resettled in the Medina, many were resettled in the emerging peripheral districts and were distributed to *Douar Hicher*, *Hayy el Walid* and *el Agba*, all located away from the old town with insufficient public transportation system connecting their new district to the downtown area where they had their economic life. The former residents were then cut off from their environment and were subject of suspicion in the new one, through discriminatory profiling (Escher, Schereps 2008). This was a singular return movement back to the city outskirts less than 30 years after inhabitants of peripheral slums were kicked out.

The second important feature of this project consisted in rehabilitating 404 buildings after they had been identified and deemed recoverable with works of consolidation and structural upgrading. This important operation involved around 1600 households and allowed safeguarding 180.000m^2 dwelling space. To this end, the municipality secured a loan of 15 million dollars from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD). A credit line for rehabilitation is still available today to property owners at a subsidized interest rate of 5%, repayable over 15 years and with free technical assistance provided by ASM. The credit also allowed saving State and Municipality rental property (40 buildings) keeping tenants in place. Buildings with an architectural and/or historical interest were restored according to a reassignment program of cultural and socio-collective equipment (kindergartens, youth clubs, centers of social or cultural associations, etc.).

Thanks to its good knowledge of the area and its social and economic condition, ASM played the role of project owner, district facilitator and mediator between public administration and citizens, most of whom were elderly or deprived people, or owners seeking advisory assistance. The association also provided technical assistance in processing credit applications and financial documents.

Project in the making: *El Kherbaor* rehabilitation of *El Maktar*[20]

In 2007, as part of safeguarding and promoting the historical city, the municipality of Tunis launched a redevelopment project of *El Kherba* district bringing back to the fore an issue examined in 1962 than in 1975 with no follow up despite the decision to expropriate 5211m^2 of bare land on 20 December 1972 and an application decree in 1974. The Municipality of Tunis entrusted the architectural and development studies of the district's bare land to the ASM (Association of the Safeguard of the Medina).

20   The features of this section are from the project card « El Khirba » published in AKROUT-YAÎCHE
        Samia, BEJAOUI Faika, GUEZZAH Abdelkrim, MOUHLI Zoubeïr, *TunisPatrimoine Vivant. Conservation
        et créativité. Association de Sauvegarde de la Médina (1980 - 2012)*, editions of the Association to
        Safeguard the Medina, Tunis, 2012, 280 pages.

The following objectives were clearly outlined:

• strengthen the urban fabric of this part of the Medina,

• stop the deterioration of the district by restructuring the demolition zone and promoting its pivotal role in the exchange between the Medina and the European part of town,

• include and reorganize business and craft activities which generate employment for the district,

• strengthen the residential quality of the Medina by keeping the existing social mix.

The urban project consisted in placing the new district in the old fabric by ensuring a morphological continuity of the traditional fabric, extending the roads and the shape of the old sections, mainly *El Morjani*, *El Maktar* and *Kouttab Louzir* streets.

In order to reinforce the commercial vocation of the area without converting residential space into economic space, it was decided to reserve most of the ground floor for commercial, craft and service activities, to place all workshops in the same plot around a patio, thus promoting solidarity and user-friendliness, and to provide for a large area in the center, of more than 700 m^2 (including galleries), organized according to stores and services on the ground floor and dwellings in the upper floor. A dumping area concealed in a park at the district entrance was planned on the south side. The project was never implemented after a consultation occurred with the population and, for the sake of the study, it is worth comparing it to interviewed residents' expectations. The issue of street furniture which is in an advanced condition of degradation when it is not completely unusable[21], is of great importance along with that of parks and playgrounds near the primary school.

Current land use

Current land use was examined mainly in the light of field visits allowing a rough identification of current use, given the complexity of urban morphology. This brief report shows a predominance of the residence function, with a large number of two-floor buildings. Occupancy types combine individual and collective dwellings (*Oukalas*) for households with high construction density. Routes are narrow and even main streets are subject to a decrease of their traffic space due to its use for commercial purposes.

In addition to residence, there is the commercial and artisan function which tends to use ground floor facilities. In some cases, these are abandoned dwellings turned into warehouses or stores or workshops. All this contributes in making the urban fabric of the Medina a multi-functional space. The inherited functional separation marked by the distinction between shopping space (*souks*) and dwellings gradually leads to an intermingling of functions with expanded activity in areas which used to be reserved for housing. This process is enhanced by the rate of negative growth of the Medina population in the last decades and the increase of abandoned dwellings.

Despite the centrality of this space, socio-collective equipment, and ordering and public service authorities are limited.

In the Ez-z*rariyya* district, dense housing dominates with distinctive features of foreign communities, especially European, who have resided since Ottoman conquest of the country. Commercial

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21 GHARBI Chokri, "Tunisie : Projet d'aménagement du terrain sis à « Mdaq El Halfa » - 76 logements de standing moyen, prêts en septembre 2009", La Presse de Tunisie, 23 February 2008, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200802251146.html

and craft activities are spread out along the roads. The red-light district *Sidi Abdallah Guech* is located there. The more central sector of *Sidi Ali Azouz* is distinguished by *El Kherba* square, legacy of second world war bombings and never rebuilt despite the multiple projects proposed. This «square »forms a gaping hole contrasting with the dense fabric and plays multiple roles of parking space, souk, and improvised playground. As to the sector of *Sidi Bou Mendil*, its main feature is its very busy shopping streets and its many hollow gaps which appeared after the collapse of unmaintained buildings.

2.4 The mobility system in the medina or the two-tier mobility

Analysis of mobility in the Medina of Tunis requires considering three main aspects: the connection of the Medina to the rest of the metropolitan area of the capital by collective public transportation and private car, the transportation organization inside the Medina and the mobility system for the transportation of goods.

### Easy access by Transportation

«In the morning I come by train (Barcelona square) then I walk the rest of the way. The benefit of working in the Medina is that it is accessible» (A., male, shopkeeper).

The quotation summarizes the undeniable benefit of the Medina in terms of access in collective transportation.

The Medina is close (less than 500 m) to the main collective transportation stations of the capital: *Barcelone* station (intercity and south suburb trains, Metro, public and private bus), *Ali Belhouane* station (bus and metro). However, despite these benefits some features limit the potential. It can be observed that these stations are east of the Medina and that west access is much less easy. In addition, there are no additional means of transportation from these stations to the boundaries of the Medina or to motor ways (*Hafsia* par exemple) making it mandatory to walk – sometimes a long way – to reach one's final destination. The bus routes which used to circle the Medina have disappeared for some time. Yet, the circular routes along what used to be the walls of the Medina were the first collective transportation routes in Tunis; the earliest horse-drawn tramway routes of 1885 connected *Bab Bhar, Bab Jazira, Kasbah, Bab Souika* and *Bab Carthagène*. These routes were used in 1902 when electric drive was introduced. The trolleybus (electric) and bus networks which later replaced electric tramways have kept these routes which connected several sections of the Medina by road along the walls. Their disappearance, not replaced when other means of transportation were provided, further reduces Medina accessibility.

Difficulty by private car

Access by private car is more difficult for two main reasons. The first is the conditions of traffic when nearing the Medina which prolongs the time of access because of traffic jams downtown. The second reason is parking availability. Large capacity car parks are located on a west-east axis and therefore north and south parts of the medina are not near a car park. As far as Kasbah car park, traffic conditions in the surrounding area have constant traffic jams making access to the car park difficult.

Types d'occupation

- Habitation avec patio
- Construction polyfonctionnelle
- Equipements socio-collectifs
- Ruines

Equipement

- Café
- Ecole
- Hôtel
- Jardin Public
- Mosquée
- Musée
- Police
- théatre

- – – Limite des secteurs de la Médina Centrale
- —— Secteurs d'étude

Map 1: Map of land use of the studied areas

Even though Medina residents cannot park their vehicles inside, near their homes, they benefit from no preferential rates in the near-by car parks, including Kasbah municipal car park whose monthly pass rates tripled a few years ago. This problem does not encourage car owners to live in the Medina. In some areas of the Medina, especially the northern part, people can park on the relatively wide streets or the small squares. Access to these streets and squares was prohibited in the past but they are accessible after municipal obstructions were removed after 2011:

«*I do not have any mobility problem: I park my car very near my shop. Everyone knows me here, no one would harm me»* (M., male, carpenter, *Sidi Kadous* street). For other locations in the Medina, opportunities to park near the place of residence or workplace are inexistent and alternatives are few leading to competition over the available spaces around the Medina:

« *When I ride my motorcycle, I must park it in Hafsia, I have no other options. Besides, there are fewer availabilities now, we don't find car parks now. Whole-salers and shopkeepers are almost invading Hafsia now* ». (Female, anonymous). For taxis, access to the Medina is a problem. On one hand, the station at *Kasbah* is almost closed because of the traffic ban around Government Square after the events of 2011, and on another hand, the deteriorated traffic conditions lead to taxi drivers' reluctance to 'venture' near the Medina and risk being trapped in the long traffic jams reducing access to the Medina.

A predominantly pedestrian area

The Medina of Tunis is a predominantly pedestrian area. Only 17% of Medina households have a car[22]. Most streets are not wide enough for car traffic. Among the remaining ones, those in shopping sections (souks) are always filled by displays making car traffic impossible and two-wheel traffic difficult; two-wheels are very little used in the Medina as they are incompatible with walking especially with such high pedestrian density. Walking remains therefore as the dominant mobility mode.

« *I live five minutes from Sidi Mehrez mosque. I walk to school; and so does my sister* » (A., male, teenager, student).

Slopes are generally mild to moderate and so suitable for walking. Walking as a single mobility method is perceived as a challenge by the elderly and the disabled. In some cases, it may lead to moving to car-accessible districts:

« *When my father fell ill and had to be taken to hospital, we had to run to Aziza Othmana facility to borrow a stretcher. We walked through the souks with him on the stretcher all the way to hospital. I am now going to move to a district in the outskirts of town. I have grown old and must often see doctors. It is difficult doing it from here, walking every time to Kasbah for a taxi or wait for my son to drive me* » (F., female, 65, retired, *Attarine* district).

On another level, the poor paving condition (which becomes a real challenge when it trains), shopkeepers' displays and waste piles –from construction works and households – seriously impede walking.

Mobility practices and transportation of goods

Moving in the Medina is mainly done on foot. This causes a problem to the disabled, the elderly and those in poor health. Reported difficulties involve moving inside the Medina and going outside as any journey requires walking – which can be several hundreds of meters – before one can reach motorways where taxis, cars and collective means of transportation are available.

22   INS figures (National Institute for Statistics) (2014)

Although it seems to be appropriate for soft mobility, the Medina creates in fact what can even be wide distinction. The disabled, the elderly and those in poor health have much low mobility potential than people in good health. This dichotomy adds to gender distinction as women tend to reduce walking outside in the evening and on Sundays.

To carry goods, the developed techniques draw on smart use of the opportunities that Medina time-space offers. Because commercial and craft activities require frequent supply and transfer of products, men-drawn carts travel across the narrow streets of the Medina throughout the day, giving rise to a whole organized system of transportation of goods. These carts, where goods are piled in rolled bundles held with rope to prevent them from falling due to the irregular surface of the ground, are drawn by laborers with difficulty but also much good sense, so that the presence of these devices along with dense pedestrian traffic is carried out smoothly. For other goods, delivery takes place very early in the morning by small vehicles:

 « [streets] *are narrow so I have to deliver to shops early in the morning to avoid contact with people*» (R., male, 28, shopkeeper, *Sidi Mehrez*).

For households, transportation of heavy items (furniture, household appliances…) is also a challenge for the same reasons as those concerning economic activities. Two common practices are used to overcome this difficulty: the first consists in hiring *Hammelas* (carriers) who provide their service to households, and the second in using small motor vehicles (tricycle, van) only Sundays when pedestrian traffic density is almost inexistent and there are no displays on public ways.

Mobility management - an unconsidered issue

In terms of governance, public actors seem to grant little importance to the question of mobility in and to the Medina; in addition to the weakness of integrating the 'mobility' dimension and national and local public policies.

Documents of mobility management (traffic plans, urban travel plan) are little operative in most municipalities in Tunisia. With a long-outdated traffic plan, Tunis does not escape this conclusion. It is worth observing that this plan entirely focused on the European part of the city and never included specific action for the Medina. The Medina seems to be left to its own as far as its organization of mobility.

Legend:

- - - - Limite Médina Centre
──── Secteurs d'étude
● Point noir de déchets
──── Etalage sur la voie

type et qualité de revêtement des voiries

──── Cul de sac avec mauvais revêtement
──── Cul de sac avec moyen revêtement
──── Cul de sac avec bon revêtement
──── Ruelle avec moyen revêtement
──── Ruelle avec bon revêtement
──── Rue avec moyen revêtement
──── Rue avec Bon revêtement

Map 2: Features of road networks in the studied areas

2.5. Conclusion

Current land use in the Medina of Tunis is the outcome of several socio-spatial processes providing this central location its present specificity. With its integrating capacity for underprivileged populations, especially in the *Oukalas* and worn out buildings, and marginalized members, the medina has served to contain populations brought forth by successive waves of immigration which add to a smaller and smaller Medina-native population. This mix of resident population, is joined by an important proportion of daily workers who spend the whole day there.

These social features combined in a dense environment which, despite its central location, is poorly serviced by socio-collective means. It is a predominantly pedestrian area which one can easily reach by collective means of transportation but which is difficult to access by private cars offering varying accessibility conditions according to age and physical ability, destination, mode of transportation and travel time. Life in this environment is punctuated by its commercial activities which permeate the urban space producing contrasting atmospheres according to the season, day and time. Together, these features determine the perception of urban insecurity and its manifestations. This is discussed in the following section.

3. PERCEPTIONS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF URBAN INSECURITY

3.1. Introduction

Based on past surveys, studied population' perceptions of the security question in the Medina have been collected and helped understand the rationale in place behind the manifestation of urban violence. Due to the qualitative nature of this nature, as well as the number of interviews and focus groups carried out, and the limited period of time, the study has not been able to produce knowledge with statistical value or a mapping of violence by occurrence. Therefore, the objective and focus were on identifying mechanisms and processes explaining how this environment with special urban and social features provides security to its residents and users.

3.2. Forms of violence and methods of analysis

Classification of forms of violence is based on the criminal code. Provisions are ordered according to seriousness, itself defined according to the penalties experienced.

Thus, the main forms of violence[23] are:

•   Theft or attempted theft with or without violence or threat (article 260 of the criminal code),

•   Willful assault (articles 218, 219, 220 of the criminal code),

•   Violation of the law on narcotics (Law n° 92-52 of 18 May 1992, on narcotics),

•   Destruction and degrading public and private property (article 304 of the criminal code; penalties are doubled when damage was caused against a civil servant (pursuant to article 305),

•   Destruction of objects intended for public use or decoration, ancient buildings, columns and architectural items and sculptures (article 162 of the criminal code).

A gradation is made according to whether violence is directed against property or people, whether theft is committed under use of threat and force and whether property is public or private.

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23   It should be noted that the sociologist Philip Milburn brings them together under two forms « of offenses, which are damage to property (theft, degradation) and neighborhood disturbance (disputes, insults, brawls) » Violence et incivilités: de la rhétoriqueexperte à la réalitéor-dinaire des illégalismes », Déviance et société, 2000 - Vol. 24 - N°4. *Les désordres urbains: regards sociologiques*. p. 331.

In his work, *criminalité et changements sociaux in Tunisia* (Bouhdiba 1965), published in the early1960's, Abdel Wahab Bouhdiba places social change at the heart of the qualitative and quantitative changes of violence in Tunisia. He demonstrates that the relationship urbanization-industrialization-delinquencies are not unequivocal based on a territorial observation, that of the non-recovery of their respective geographical distributions. The author then suggests the introduction of a second reading key, that of using collective perception of violence as barometer.

«*Of all delinquency factors, it is certainly urbanization which we believe is the most relevant and the gap is the regional divide*» (Bouhdiba 1983). In fact, *«crime decreases as we go from North to South and from East to West»*.

Expressed in the 1960's, this observation will take its whole dimension in the Medina of Tunis which will later experience growing ruralization. We explained this phenomenon, referring to Jellal Abdelkafi' works, above. It occurred under the effect of waves of migration largely from the same areas we have just described as less affected by crime. They will supply the capital, and especially the Medina, with its newcomers. However, figures provided by the Ministry of Justice on cases dealt with in 1979-1980 and highlighted by the researcher no longer than 18 years later, reveal totally different dynamics. Thus, the gap between the coastline and hinterland in terms of the annual number of cases of violence is fading away with amplitude barely exceeding 10% (299 cases per year annually in Tunis, 300 in Nabeul, 379 in Mahdia) while cities like Siliana and Kasserine with rates of 413 and 305 respectively come up in part of the ranking where only cities of the coastline and the capital used to be. In that period, for the first time after independence major uprisings broke out and random violence was committed by men and women who lashed out at public and private property. A. Bouhdiba qualified it as «*violence for violence sake*». The movement gained momentum when it involved high schools and universities in the capital during the spring of 1981 when students went wild after the equipment in their facilities which they heavily and ruthlessly degraded. State response consisted in creating a police force, the brigade of public order (*BPO*) which Tunisians soon became familiar with due as much to the appearance of its members as to the moniker in referring to it, «*brigade of people's oppression*»

For the author, urban growth, urbanization and violence make a more coherent triptych since urbanization, as transition from one way of life to another, is combined with the rise of violence and the marginalization of the absorbed populations (Miossec, Signoles 1982). Thus, a low urbanization rate, with high urban growth is much more likely to disrupt social balance than a high urbanization rate with low urban growth; in which case, « *modest but judicious reception facilities, some constancy in change ensure progress at a humane pace* » (Bouhdiba 1983). And it is precisely the second scenario which the Medina has experienced, through the influx of rural population settling in particular in the *oukalas*.

Moreover, the Medina geography and the conception of the world and of human society which it embodies, make of it a place where poverty does not imply marginalization. The system of sacred traditional values involved permanence and loyalty to the immutability of the creed. The new districts, these areas created ex-nihilo after independence, and the adoption of the new values of the Nation-State, had to glorify taste for change, constancy in inconsistency, the permanent quest of excellence, novelty and drive towards a certainly better but always distant indefinite.

The Medina has always ignored ranking districts in rich and poor, residential and popular; the only specialization embedded in the fabric of the city was that of trades, distributed by souks

according to strict and clear rules and the most sumptuous dwellings can unsurprisingly, be next to the most modest. Thus, «*values in society were defined according to a sacred and indivisible apprehension of life and human dignity*» (Bouhdiba 1983). For A. Bouhdiba, the new triptych adds marginalization to urbanization and violence. Marginalized populations, young people, students and the unemployed were already singled out during the events which had affected the capital at the end of the 1970's. It seemed they were suffering of insecurity and engendered violence in response. They put fire to their high schools and universities, dismantled street furniture, lashed out at public equipment which had embodied, to the preceding generations, the sacrifices made after independence to promote egalitarian social progress with instruction, promotion of teaching and its generalization as the only foundation. Clear rules.

The same phenomenon was thoroughly studied by sociologists François Dubet and Didier Lapeyronnie who, with the word «*galère*» 'nightmare', reflected the unease of some young people in underprivileged districts suffering from a combination of evils like unemployment, school failure, tense relationships with parents etc. «*The nightmare is dominated by uncertainty, floating, weak networks, long periods of idleness interrupted by odd jobs, delinquency (still omnipresent but not spectacular)* » (Idiri 1996). The 'nightmare' appears as the result of three intertwining factors: social disorganization, exclusion and domination. Young people experiencing this 'nightmare' feel excluded from society and their response may, in some cases, be in the form of violence when exclusion is too strong. Their 'fury' is expressed through 'random and aimless' violence. Referring to these young people, Christian Bachman emphasized the unique relationship with the neighborhood, the only place young people have appropriated and controlled. It is both a shelter and a place of captivity (Bachman 1992).

With the failure of school integration and the absence of work (which is rare and daily jobs, being provisional, could not be assimilated to stable employment), identity is constructed on belonging to the neighbourhood and gathering in groups. This cultivates cohesion and pride of belonging to a territory formed by the neighbourhood. « *There, we make 'deals', scams: petty crime (theft), narcotics trade, in short, all the acts of an informal economy* » (Favreau 1993).

In exploring the 'nightmare', young people's unease, the authors mention the three key professions in the intervention: teachers, social workers (and similar occupations) and police officers (Dubet 1992). The last group seems to be the target of young people's discontent[24]. The police was established in an authoritarian State after independence and symbolized violence and arbitrariness of society as a whole. According to Laurent Mucchielliit, the rise of the expression «*urban violence*» adding that «*never has a concept first used in police context ever been so (politically) successful*» (Muchielli 2001).

Resting on the works mentioned, we wanted to outline an analysis network allowing to compare the collected data to a grid meaningfully used in France, a country with which Tunisia shares many features in the structure and operation of internal security forces.

When urban riots broke out at *Vaulx-en-Vélin*, in the suburbs of Lyon in October 1990 and in July 1991 in the suburbs of Paris (*Sartrouville, Mantes-la-jolie, Meaux, Garges-les-Gonesse*), the term «*urban violence*» became well established in the language of media,

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24   For the United Nations (UN), youth is the category of people between the ages of 15 and 24, extend-ed in some studies to 29 (transition age for young people who stayed longer in education) in *Défis de la jeunessetunisienne*, publication of the United Nations Population Fund, Tunis, 2015.

security professionals and most researchers. These events generated different institutional reactions including the creation of the section *Villes et banlieues (cities and suburbs)* in the *Direction centrale des Renseignements Généraux (R.G.) (Central Directorate of General Intelligence)*, in April 1991. This section, in charge of anticipating riots, was placed under the authority of Chief Commissioner Bui-Trong who achieved a mapping of «*sensitive districts*» to measure the extent of «urban violence» based on offenses recorded by the police. This approach is based on the assumption that «riots do not occur out of nothing, but are rooted in small and medium collective juvenile delinquency, open and provocative, taking different forms always following the same direction» (Bui-Trong 1998). This section set up an eight-level evaluation system called «*evaluation scale of insecurity in cities*» from level 1 (group violence which can reach murder but is devoid of anti-institutional character) to level 8 (guerilla, riots, massive and prolonged clashes with the police).

For many reasons, the use of this system is limited. First, the urban dimension of the term refers to « *sensitive districts* » in cities of France and violence included «*all the acts of open and provocative rebellion against order and institutions often committed by groups of young people from these sensitive districts; they are criminal acts with increasing intensity according to whether victims are private individuals or institutions, or, in particular, the police*» (Mace 1999).

3.3. Absence of random violence

A major feature of urban violence mainly during the 80's and 90's in Tunisia and France where it is referred to as 'nightmare' and its corollary 'random violence', expression of fury, is that it is rarely mentioned by the victims and witnesses with whom we conducted interviews in the Medina. The single listed case out of the thirty interviews conducted is more of an exception. Most cases of reported violence are on robbery, mugging, off motorcycles generally, and are part of *«theft or attempted robbery or with or without violence or threat»* (article 260 of the criminal code).

For A., male, 38, souk district «*these young people are not mean or aggressive but when they are out of drugs they commit burglaries, including in shops usually under their protection*».

The same is for B., female, fifties, community leader in El Maktar district,
« *in the neighbourhood crime is more the result of the state as the aggressor, whether they are high or not– there is little violence in fact* ».

This observation comes with explanations enlightening on the reasons why many young people are involved in drug use and in theft committed to procure narcotics, and also, and this hinders rational reasoning, to purchase luxury products not matching young people's and especially residents' standard of living: « *He wants a new pair of training shoes, his mother does not give him the money he needs, he snatches a piece of jewelry off someone and gets two pairs. They dress well, better than the people at Hafsia. It's easy money […]* »Parents fear this atmosphere at roundabouts so much that the father of M, male, 24, student, joined several associations, *Souk el Blat* district: « *better stand opposite the red-light district (kârti) than at a roundabout* ».

Thus, violence is often related to drug and alcohol use which affects users' ability of discernment as they may no longer recognize neighbours and familiar faces and break neighbourhood codes. Mugging and robbery generate from the drive to meet needs which can be to use drugs or buy valued items. Assaults without cause are generally committed by young people under the effect of drugs or alcohol.

3.4. Security response

Security system

Safe territorial division of the Medina, places it under the control of the «Sector» (*mantaqa*) of the Medina which is under Greater Tunis district located at Bab Souika. The sector includes in the same building:

• the sector (*mantaqa*), conceived as chief police precinct,

• the police station (*markazchorta*) of Bâb Souika,

• the technical police brigade (*Chorta fanniyya*), responsible for issuing identity cards and criminal record statements.

The sector includes 5 police stations:

• *Halfaouine* (eastern suburb of the Medina, daytime operation),

• *Al Aswâq* (*Souk* station, central Medina, located at *Djemaa Zitouna* street in the old Capuchin Friars chapel, daytime operation),

• *Kasbah* (located on *Bab Bnet* boulevard adjoining the presidency of the government, continuous operation, day and night – at night called '*night-duty*'),

• *Hafsia* (located on the ground floor of one of Dr.Cassar's buildings, daytime operation),

• *Bâb Souika* (located in the chief police precinct and controlling the areas of *Kherba* and *Bâb Menara*, day and night operation) and

• Pedestrian patrol brigade of *Sidi el Morjani* street.

In fact, at night, as it is on 'night-duty' *Kasbah* police station has control over central Medina.

Main offenses

The main crimes reported in the Medina are the following:

• Possession and use of drugs: it is to be found among the residents of *Sabbaghine*, *Torbet el Bey* and *El Maktar* street. Offenders are from these districts but also others such as *Saïda* (western suburb of Medina), *Ras Ed-Darb* and *Mellassine*. *Zarkoun* street and *Bâb Djedid* districts are also reported as places of residence of drug offenders.

• Snatching thefts: this robbery technique is preferred to other robbery because penalties are much lower (from 5 years to 6 months). In addition, the speed of the act leaves little chance to the victim to recognize and identify the aggressor. The absence of direct confrontation with the victim reduces the risk of abuse by the aggressor in the form of use of force or violence. Critical place and time are daytime between 11am and 3pm, sometimes 9am, in the souks and *Zarkoun* street when they are the busiest.

- Robbery: robbery targets are mainly cell phones and valuables identified by offenders. Women are their main victims. Locations most reported by the police for this type of offense are *Zarkoun* street, *Djemaa Zitouna* street, the *Souks* and *Hafsia*. It is to be noted that *Hafsia* district and *Djemaa Zitouna* street have police stations operating daytime. Victims are not from those districts (you don't assault people you know or who living in your neighborhood). Robbery is often motivated by the purchase of narcotics (including Subutex[25] and Ecstasy[26]). Robbery has become endemic in some parts of the city to the point where *Bab Sidi Kacem*, western suburb, was the subject of a fixed control device (day and night, all week).

Security approach

Security response also involves coordination througyh daily meetings involving local actors, mainly delegates (*moatmed*), sub-delegates (*omda*) and possibly principals of primary and secondary schools in the sectors concerned.

The procedure consists of having foot patrols walking along determined and known routes. These can be part of urban police (judiciary police) or public security (road police). The first are in civilian clothes and the second are in easily recognizable uniforms. In theory, these patrols should include at least 1 + 6 members for backup, or a total of 9 people. But in practice, only public order patrols are that many. Civil patrols, easily recognizable with the sound from their transmission devices, are 3 on average. Backup for these patrols is available at main crossroads to allow identifying and arresting suspects in a given area. The main work of identification and response is based on indications and denunciations. As for the resources used, unlike urban security brigade (judiciary police), public security brigade (road police) does not include a night patrol for lack of staff (human resources).

Another significant fact in terms of ensuring security in the area, is the low number of fixed roadblocks in the Medina like the one at *Bab Sidi Kacem* which, although in place for a long time, is still regarded as provisional and was placed following the increasing number of robberies at that Medina accessway. Apart from *Kasbah* security system protecting government buildings, mainly the Presidency of the government, the main law enforcement system is at the junction between central Medina and the European part of the city, at *Bab Bhar* at avenue of France and *Porte de France*. It is a large daytime system (with a dozen uniformed officers) but the absence of a night system at key periods, reduces its effectiveness.

It is to be observed that the complexity of the districts complicates law enforcement intervention through arrests after complaint reception and dissemination of composite drawings. Interviews revealed the high mobility of offenders who commit their crimes outside their districts and in distant areas where they have no usual business. This raises the question of coordination between the Medina and neighbouring districts, such as *Mellassine* which has produced several offenders.

25   Trade name of a molecule close to morphine. It is prescribed to willing adults and teenagers above 15, highly addicted to heroin or related drugs at the beginning of weaning as part of a global management with medical, social and psychological therapy.

26   « Ecstasy or MDMA is an illegal drug in all countries. It acts as a stimulant producing intense energizing effects and heightened enjoyment of tactile experience. It also causes hallucinations and distortions of the visual field. MDMA may affect the brain by altering the activity of neurotransmitters which ensure communication between nerve cells in the brain » in http://www.drogues-dependance.fr/ ecstasy.html

Effectiveness is also limited by the existence of competition between districts and the non-existence of any coordination and work in common. Common interventions are rare (only one testimony collected) and less successful given the impact of community policing and degradation of the relationship with the population and so loss of a valuable source of information; which is the basis of any security work in the Medina.

Multiple roles of the police

Police role tends to widen in a society where public actors lack effectiveness. Thus, respondents' testimonies on school exclusion and family condition for many young people prompts rethinking the role of security intervention with regard to the requests they receive.

For example, B., male, 30's, activist at *Hafsia* asserts that «*overwhelmed mothers sometimes go to the police for help».* The operating mode in this respect deserves attention. One mother sought police assistance regarding her son's education. In the absence of the father, she feared her son might be influenced by bad company in the neighbourhood and would use drugs or commit offenses. She spoke to the chief officer (chief commander of the neighbourhood police station) seeking assistance. The officer then invited the teenager and threatened him. The adolescent eventually addressed a neighborhood association requesting that it «*mediate between him and his mother and the police*».

While performing this role, the police officer steps away from his primary duty (identify, report and punish wrongdoing) and performs mediation work where the agreement with the guardian who confided in him transcended the classical operating mode. In doing so, there is an attempt made towards accomplishing preventive work, though it is neither formalized nor regulated.[27]

This kind of undertaking is carried out by police officers with thorough knowledge of the district, its urban morphology and its population through long field experience. Relationships with the local population, and knowledge of the people and their problems based on coordination with the delegate, sub-delegates and representatives of local institutions (mainly the school system), are very fragile and can be harmed by awkward, or inappropriately violent interventions. This was the case in October 2016 during a heavy police intervention aimed at removing illegal street vendors. They were from *Jelma*, a city in the east-center of the country, who had settled in the Medina. At *El Kherba*, *El Maktar*, and *Torbet el Bey* police officers with whom we had informal conversations, admitted that it was not easy to intervene and that it was better to negotiate and adopt conciliatory attitudes to achieve one's objectives. This assessment is in sharp contrast with young people's statements in the neighbourhood who mention police violence and administration harassment characterizing their relationships with the police.

The choice made by local police to establish dialogue with the population, is not, as observed above, the outcome of a lack of means, since backup is available and can be mobilized, but rather of the inadequacy of the backup which is inappropriate as they respond with force without coordination with the local officers who know the people. Indeed, backup which intervenes mainly during security campaigns (*hamalâtamniyya*), includes officers from other districts who

27   When the Tunisian anti-drug legislation (law n°92-52 of 18 May 1992 relating to narcotics), consid-ered particularly repressive, was relaxed following an amendment of the code of criminal procedure, adopted on Tuesday 25 April 2017 by the Tunisian parliament, marking the culmination of three years of discussion of anti-drug legislation, security forces and the judiciary were able to show relative leniency in the application. See https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/La-Tunisie-assouplit-leg-islation-anti-drogue-2017-04-27-1200842794

are unaware of the specific features on the ground and do not know the local population; which places local officers in an awkward position towards the inhabitants. Excessive use of force, where deterrence can be sufficient, and a few acts of violence, although they are reported as isolated cases, by some local officers who have retained bad practices of the old regime, undermine neighbourhood police work. Thus, local officers who have built a relationship with the residents lose the trust they have gained.[28]

Neighborhood work is particularly important in the context of *oukala* control. These are in fact the favourite locations for individuals wanted by the police and security forces, serving as refuge where families and other adults live. The *oukalas* act in practice as hotels where rooms are rented separately and where tenants' identity is checked in situ. *Oukalas* played an important role in *El Maktar*. According to tacit agreement, owners provide the police with cards tenants fill in upon arrival, containing tenants' ID information. This process facilitates identifying and locating wanted individuals.

The information provided, which is the outcome of close neighbourhood work, allows the police to prevent crime and offenses and to control young people's movement in the neighbourhood. It is those who go outside their assigned space towards other districts of the city who are subject of repression.

Security forces - ultimate public actor?

Outlining the intervention area of security forces in the Medina is essentially linked to other actors' performance. However, in the Medina what can be noted is the weak presence of the main state actors and the limited scope of their action (educational, cultural, health, social, municipal institutions and bodies of childhood protection). This leads security forces to perform acts, in some cases, which are not part of their usual duties. Such operational shift has been denounced by police officers who regret its negative impact on police image and the slippage risk that the fact of performing duties outside one's area of expertise may entail. Thus, relationships with local institutions (delegates, sub-delegates, school principals, presidents of municipal districts)[29] involve a kind of police superiority since police forces are regarded to be alone capable of dealing with difficult situations. Therefore, state actors do not hesitate to hand over their tasks to the police to solve internal problems which are normally part of their own field of competence in the districts and areas under their control. Under excessive pressure of requests for intervention, the police get therefore into solving social and economic problems, totally unrelated to security. What is at play here is the influence and capacity for intimidation that even non-commissioned officers can have, and which determines this delegation of responsibility. In fact, security services are used by other public officials for pressure over citizens, allowing them to reach their ends.

28   Young people appreciate local officers who live in their neighbourhood and regret that they cannot intervene on their behalf as mediators: « We have ouled el houma *policemen, they are good guys, with good ethics who socialize with us, but they cannot do anything ! When the police turn up, they flee with us, and they [the police] threaten to pull them out of police service* ». (F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district)

29   Criteria for the appointment of delegates and sub-delegates are criticized by many respondents. The issue of geographical origin and insufficient knowledge of the social reality of the district were subjects of complaints against these State employees. As an example, this is a statement by M., male, 24, student, who works with various associations, *Souk el Blat district: « If the sub-delegate (omda) had been a oueldhouma, many problems would hve been avoided. Here, the sub-delegate is from Gafsa, what can he understand [to the district and its inhabitants] ? »*

This reversal of roles, whereby competent authorities delegate their duties to police services which are neither authorized nor qualified for them, leads to a confusion of roles and, given the scope and high concentration of power in a single body, generates its omnipotence and so the increased risk of converting some degree of tolerance and preferential treatments into cash.

Limits of police intervention

Testimonies by respondents, whether Medina residents or users, refer to ambivalent relationships with police forces as a powerful public actor and as a feared body.

Testimonies on the post-2011 period reveal surprising inaction, generating the feeling of being in the jungle where self-redress is exercised in the absence or withdrawal of security forces.

«*When I went to the police to file a complaint after I had been assaulted and requested police intervention, the officer said: « hit him, when you see him hit him! We can do nothing for you »* (Y., male, thirties, liberal profession, souk district).

Such resignation and invitation to exercise vigilantisms contrasts however with other cases where a thief's arrest by the inhabitants upsets the police who ask to no longer intervene and to simply inform the police. According to N., male, sixties, craftsman in Hafsia district:
« *Theft is dealt with by '*ouled el Houma' (kids from the block)*. When they identify a criminal from outside the neighbourhood they catch him, beat him up and deliver him to the police. They are told:* "*why did you do this? You must not touch him. You should have brought him over and we know what to do with him* "».

Perception of the action of security forces

People are divided in their perception of the action of security forces. The mode of intervention is often described as brutal and disproportionate, and in some cases ineffective.

In the first case, the *modus operandi* of officers shows absence of consideration of the inherent qualities of the areas of intervention and causes problems to local officers who, in their everyday work get closely involved with the residents. Y., male, 33, liberal profession, souk district describes police involvement as *« raids in packs »*

In addition, physical presence is described as insufficient. Such insufficiency is reflected in particular by the fact that many police stations close at night; leaving the area of central Medina under the control of *Kasbah* police station alone, and city residents and users stunned by what they believe is a withdrawal from the city: « *Is it usual for a police station to shut its doors at 6.30-7 pm? They lock the gate… Isn't a police station supposed to remain open day and night? What happens to security? »* (N., male, 60's, craftsman at Hafsia).

The city - Sometimes heaven, Sometimes jail

Outside their neighbourhood, young people refer to the difficulty they face moving in central Medina and outside. Hence, north Medina (*Bab Souika*) does not offer easy access. To them, moving there is like exposing themselves to other policemen and other people and facing other complexities.

« *They hesitated a lot before agreeing to visit (Djemaa Zitouna street) because [the exhibition was in an old guest house of Djemaa Zitouna street] in another district, near a central police station* ». (B., 30's, activist working with youth in El Maktar district).

If under this tacit agreement security forces can control the areas of the Medina under their authority, the consequences for their mobility in the area are instructive. Thus, according to B., to leave the district would mean for these young people « exposing themselves to the risk of meeting other cops than those of the Medina. If they get arrested in the Medina, they know they get released because they are known to police officers. Outside, they can be kept longer in jail ».

The district may then turn into a prison whose jailers are the young people themselves, who are prisoners as much of their own confinement in a strictly codified neighbourhood, as they are of the relationship with the police who does not grant a second chance to offenders.

3.5 Types of violence and their perception

Everyday violence

This tradition of violence seems to be one of the forms of expression of everyday violence. It is trivialized and marks the daily life of young people and of their district. Thus, according to T., male, 28, calligrapher, who lives in a wealthy suburb and works in Hafsia:

"*In Hafsia, violence is a means of communication. If you're not violent, you don't belong here. You must be violent to communicate with others. Violence means that you do not speak softly, it's a freaking mess. The dynamics in the street [Dr. Cassar Street] and in street crossings is quite different. Street crossings are the dark side of the districts, you see everything ... hashish, guys who get drunk ... everything. You see people you've never seen before. I have only been in Hafsia for a year, one of them said to me: "we are like fish, if we go out of Hafsia, we die*".

They have a violent mode of communication, they insult and disrespect each other (tayyhouqdarb'adhhom): "*you son of a bitch*" ... *Physical violence is also present because it is a means of communication.*" Verbal bullying, consecrated in daily exchanges, adds to a certain culture of violence firmly rooted in the traditions of early childhood education, at schools, and legitimized as an extension of parental authority and parents' right to educate.

Its importance is raised by E., female, 30, activist in associations in El Maktar district: "*We note that children are violent. The art and education program began two years ago and the first remark we receive from parents is "hit him if he is not quiet*"."

Violence is also ritualized through ram fights. During our field visit to El Maktar district, we located about 6 sites for rams breeding in view of ram fights which, according to the district youth, take place daily in El Maktar Square (useless to locate it, this place does not exist on the city map. It is in fact a wasteland having succeeded to the wreckage of a house which had collapsed): *"[We usually meet] around ram fights, we like ram fights, or a football match."* (F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district).

Ram fights can also escalate into brawling between young men in the district, probably because of the bet that accompanies these activities: "*In our district, there can be a brawl because of a ram. After fighting, they reconcile in the morning. One does not intervene except when there is use of knives or serious things that might happen. I happened to hit someone and then said "sorry, I should not have but I was angry" and he took it pretty well* "(M., male, 24, student, district of Souk el Blat).

Can we talk about violence against public facilities?

The answer is short but decisive, for it would be necessary for the area under study to have basic equipment. But if we take the case of the districts of El Maktar, Sidi Ali Azzouz and El Sabbaghine, field visits reveal that some institutions where many public facilities used to be have disappeared (Martial Arts Hall and Boxing at street Sidi el Banna, Cinema streetSidi el Banna) are closed (Hassen Zmerli Cultural Center at L'ecole street, Dar Ben Abdallah at Ben Abdallah street, Museum of Arts and Popular Traditions, Mausoleum of the Tunisian royal family, Torbet el Bey, located in the street of the same name), are not accessible (Dar Othman Palace El Mebazaa street), or have never existed (playgrounds). The only cultural activity of the district of El Makter seems to be today the Street Art Association, creator and organizer of the Dream City festival which knew how to build cooperation dynamics with many young people of the district.

Drugs

The issue of drug consumption was largely obscured and little known until the study conducted by Senim Ben Abdallah for the Association to Safeguard the Medina (ASM) of Tunis (Ben Abdallah 2017). This study, which was limited to schools, has shown that most of the young people surveyed say they know hashish (80.4%), 42.6% cocaine, 37.3% tablets, 29.8% ecstasy and 20.0% Subutex. The diversity of products and substances in circulation is confirmed by the interviews conducted in the Medina. A community activist was surprised "*they even tried to sell us coke"* (B., female, fifties, association activist in the district of El Maktar). Firm punishment exists nevertheless, in fact, even if until recently, consumption led to de facto imprisonment whatever the substance.

Thus, in practice, if the consumption of hashish predominates and can occur in public in some districts, such as El Maktar, the other substances are consumed more discreetly in more remote and less accessible places. Thus, according to Y., male, 33, living in the souks, "*Young people use hashish but also Subutex or ecstasy (*hrabech)". Drug injection leads to a phenomenon of space privatization and securing the areas during specific time slots where use may be restricted. Thus, "*for hard drugs, young people go to Dar Ben Abdallah Square. The door of the alley can be closed, and the place is made private for the evening. Young people put one of them, a shaggy guy armed with a knife between the teeth who keeps the place at night when the young are there taking drugs [...] A few problems of theft or aggression have occurred in this neighbourhood "*(B., female, 50's, association activist in the district of El Maktar).

Affecting boys more than girls[30], narcotics consumption may lead to harmful behavior that may have more or less serious consequences on the health of young people themselves as well as those in the direct environment. These include physical or verbal bullying, sexual exploitation (drug dealing in exchange of sex), robbery and robbery with violence in order to buy the daily dose.

If young people appear to be the main consumers, the impact of this scourge may also affect young children who mix with adults and live with traces of consumption in their environment.

30   A survey conducted in 2005 on high school students in Tunis showed that drug use affects boys more than girls (drugs affect 22.6% of boys and 2.9% of girls) and that users of drugs are from ex-treme social groups (wealthy or inactive parents) in AMRANI Radhia, ERRAIS Sarra, *"Risk factors of drug use in school in Tunis"*, Family and population, n ° 4-5, December 2005, publications of the National Office of Family and Population (ONFP)

According to E., female, 30, activist in the district of El Maktar "*The impact of this daily use of drugs has effects on children ... They sniff chalk, some come to the art workshop with syringes in their hands!"*

Some ambivalence is to be noted, though. Indeed, young people engaged in the consumption and sale of narcotics show a certain protectionism over the younger ones by trying "*not to show their consumption of narcotics. They try to protect the district kids."* This is shown when they forbid smoking as F, young male from El Maktar district, who "*terrorizes children who buy tobacco for their parents and sends them home"* (B., male, 30 , activist in the district of El Maktar).

Nevertheless, you cannot prevent the younger ones to identify with the older. Although seniors do not want to see the younger ones follow their path, some behaviours reflect a real influence exercised by seniors. According to B., female, 50's, activist in El Maktar district, "*When we stop kids in the street, they are between 7 and 10 years old and they smoke, take drugs and are proud of it! "*

Drinking in public

While alcohol consumption is not legally reprehensible, it remains in fact associated with harmful behaviour that endangers the lives of young people, including drinking and driving, growing violence and unsafe sexual practices. For example, the survey carried out by the National Youth Observatory (ONJ) on delinquency (Ben Nacer 2006) showed that for most of the boys surveyed, alcohol consumption is associated with socializing. For the girls surveyed, alcohol consumption is synonymous with sexual encounters or even sex work (Ben Nacer 2006). According to the national survey on school adolescents'[31] health, 20.4% of the adolescents surveyed consumed alcoholic drinks at least once, with male predominance (33.5% boys versus 7.5% girls). Almost 77% of the boys interviewed (as against 22.2% for girls) report having been drunk at least once and 41.7% of them have been drunk several times (compared to 8.8% for girls).

The study on drug use among students (aged 15 and over) (Ben Abdallah 2017) revealed that 17.3% of the respondents reported having consumed alcohol at least once compared to 82.7% who declared having never consumed. Boys are more likely than girls to report drinking alcohol (32.2% boys versus 3.3% girls), but more of them report drinking at least once a fortnight (27% for girls vs. 10.8% for boys). The girls surveyed are therefore occasional drinkers. The boys interviewed drink more regularly: 25.0% of them drink at least once a week. Finding beer cans and bottles of wine on the floor is common in the Medina, alcohol consumption does not require hiding from passers-by and security forces as the penalties incurred, proportional to the gravity of the offense, are not significant.

Nevertheless, both alcohol and drug users are mobile. Mobility is directly related to the nature and intensity of the products consumed. The choice of the place for consumption is made according to the practice of using the public space in the district. The street remains the principal place of consumption of drugs (44.2% according to the results of the Study on the consumption of the drugs among high school students in the Medina of Tunis) followed by home (23.2%) and high school (20.9%) (Ben Abdallah 2017). Thus in El Maktar, the Square of the same name is busy during the day by homemakers who meet there for shopping, then by the old men of the district. In addition, a restaurant, which opened a few years ago there, attracts many people.

31   Department of School and University Medicine, National Survey of Adolescent School Health, Tunis, DMSU, 2004.

Children are used to playing a few meters away, in Dar Othman Square, where young people would settle in the late afternoon but cannot indulge in alcohol consumption. According to E., female, 30's, in El Maktar district "*In order to drink, they go to another place, in a hidden alleyway, near the Sabbaghine well, and in a ruined house. This street, full of craftsmen during the day, is empty at night and they can go there to drink at night"*. El Maktar Street, located in a dilapidated area but with many large houses and significant monuments, is very dark at night. The light lamps just installed by municipal services are deliberately destroyed, hit with stones. Added to the state of degradation of the building, the many squares around ruined houses, the absence of police patrols and the piles of rubbish, this makes the place uninviting and deserted at night. Young people feel free to drink, simply grouping themselves in secondary roads and uninhabited places (such as el Sabbaghine Street).

In the souks, the crossroads of main axes, called in the local jargon "roundabouts", constitute the nocturnal gathering places. According to Y., male, 30's, liberal profession, in the souks district: "*In the morning, they are in cafés and at night they are in the roundabouts drinking alcohol ... they watch passers-by and can be disturbing at times too. They drink and then move on to something else, especially hashish"*

Police violence anticipatory counter violence

Interviews with young people from different districts revealed a complex relationship with the police. Many of them mention police violence. This violence may be deliberate, and part of a long-standing tradition based on intimidation and contempt; while according to an officer informally interviewed, "*popular districts like the Medina require specific treatment with a focus on the local police and on the safety and security of the inhabitants whom we must protect"*. This statement echoes that of A., male, 30, liberal profession, district of the souks: "*since 2011, Kasbah police no longer know the inhabitants of the Medina."*

Many of the young people interviewed, mostly unemployed and having dropped out of school at secondary level, had trouble with the law and had already been sentenced to prison for attempts of illegal migration or for petty crimes (concealment, theft, pickpocketing, snatching thefts, robberies,) say they find no support when they leave prison. They feel deeply uncomfortable and suffer from not being given a second chance stating, " *if you enter prison, you'll often be returning because whatever you do, you are always at fault*". According to B., female, 50's, community leader in El Maktar district, they live in fear, "*afraid of the police, of the slightest noise and cannot go to sleep if they are not high".* She confirms what the youngsters reveal in many interviews, namely the impossibility of a complete redemption for a young person already convicted remaining marked for life by a "presumption of guilt" and being offered no access to an economic and social reintegration program. For M., male, 20, unemployed, El Maktar district, *"Let's say someone made a mistake (*ghlot*), went to jail and served his sentence, if they [the police] catch him, they take him to the police station."*

To this presumption of guilt is added the gratuitous humiliation, not only about the arrest itself but also for the verbal and physical violence as evidenced by F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district: "I *stole, so I'm going to prison, right? Why are you beating me up? You humiliate me, you treat me like a dog? The law says: "this is a thief, he will spend 6 months in prison", did the law tell you to beat me up? Is it to humiliate me? It's a mentality ».*

To this humiliation is added the practice of unequal treatment according to whether you are rich or powerful. Dealing with theft, and the legal consequences, varies according to M., male, 20, unemployed, living in El Maktar area: "*when you are arrested for a snatch theft, give 500 dinars and the complaint will be filed against X, and you go home.*" For F., male, 25, unemployed, from El Maktar district, "*if you have been sentenced you are the perfect target to endorse the crimes of another.*" *They [the police] say to themselves," This one has already been in prison "and they look at you as a tramp, a beggar," take him, you can stick any case on him*" which leads to a form of administrative harassment resulting in unjustified arrests and long identity verifications due to outdated search notices on the computer system. (G., male, 20.)

With no attempt at purifying them, knowing that many of these young people are legitimately caught for offenses they have committed, this excessive arbitrariness, however, must be considered because even when they did not commit the crimes they are accused of "*they [young people from the district] are still harassed. Some of them came here to ask for help; we always know who the author is, but these young people are immediately arrested and pestered because they have already been sentenced. "* (*E., female, activist in El Maktar area)

When they venture out of their district, these young people prepare an escape plan, after studying the exits so they can flee and return to their district in case of police raids. The morphology of the Medina, the reticular characteristic of the site, the possibilities of using the roofs are favorable for these plans.

This tense relationship gives rise to a singular dynamic, related to the spiral of violence thus produced. Young people's testimonies about their district life, are full of anecdotes about the violence in their relationships with the police; physical and moral violence felt during the interventions notably: "*when they [the police] intervene by beating us up direct [sic.], how do you want us to behave? You have to hit to save yourself. Here, it's full of dead ends, sometimes you come face-to-face with [a policeman]. You have to hit and run away, or they'll get you down [...] Even if you did not do anything, he [the policeman] gives you a beat! And talk to you roughly, insult your mother, that kind of thing! And you, you did not do anything! How do you want to live? Here in the Medina, how do you want to behave with villains, and how to behave with the police? Violence started with them. They are the ones who rooted violence in us. They behave badly with us; how do you want us to behave well?*" (F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district).

Under the term "Es-Sâbiqrâbih" (who anticipates wins), F., male, 25, from El Maktar district, defines the watchword observed by young people in their confrontational relations with police officers. Playing with the peculiarities of an old city, where they know every nook and cranny, and the many possibilities offered by its urban layout, young people, especially those with a criminal record already full, have developed avoidance strategies. When it is not possible to know the police officers' movement in the Medina, and they find themselves face to face with one of them, violence is the only way they can choose. These fortuitous encounters usually result in aggressing the agent, at worst, and attempting to escape, at best. It is therefore a question of assaulting before being assaulted by the police officer. This "anticipatory violence" feeds the vicious circle of violence.

Executioners and crusaders: District justice with regard to the code of honour

There is nevertheless an anomaly in this reasoning when we look at the *modus operandi* of the police forces in the Medina. In some cases, mainly pickpocketing or robbery, it is as if the security forces "delegate" the resolution of certain situations of violence to young people in the district referring the victim to members of the groups controlling the area where the theft took place. In all the cases mentioned by the interviewees, the victim was thus able to recover his/ her belongings without any compensation, through the mediation of the "young people of the district" who take up with the author and convince him to return the stolen property. This is a confirmation that youth control over their district is widely established and that they are able to make it known by peers in other parts of the city. This support for the resolution of theft cases also exists in the case of solicitations by other children of the district (*ouled el houma*).

Ouled el Houma, appears, therefore, as the chief defender of the district, and of the code of honour regulating his and the neighbours' conduct. This includes: protecting the district, the inhabitants and their families, especially women, against attackers from outside.

As a result, a form of collaboration is established with the local police, the vis-a-vis being the district police station. For N., male, 60's, craftsman in the district of Hafsia: "*Theft is under the responsibility of* ouled el houma. *If they recognize a stranger, they catch him, beat him up, and deliver him to the police station."*

Similarly, offenses committed in the district are not usually attribued to the inhabitants, even if they usually commit offenses (consumption and sale of narcotics, robberies, pickpocketing) because they are not supposed to commit violations in the districts where they belong. These are more their refuge in case of sensitive issues with the police and where they can count on the neighbours' solidarity. "*The authors of that violence and drug sale are not* ouled el Houma*! Those acts are committed by Brayniyya [strangers to the district] because* ouled el houma *know you and cannot harm you but strangers are scary and there are strangers in all districts. Where do they come from? They make bonds in jail with the old men of the district then come to visit them and sell ecstasy, hashish and the district becomes rotten"* (N., male, 60's, craftsman in the district of Hafsia).

However, this code of honour allows that occasional visitors to the district become a target, those who do not have any social ties or relationships to make them entitles to the protection they themselves enjoy. Thus, according to the same respondent, snatching thefts committed there even in the middle of the day at Sidi Mahrez [souk], are followed by more obvious and threatening procedures*: "the evening is the time for blocking fences! You are told: "give what you have", threatened with a knife"[32]*

"*I avoid the district of Torbet el Bey because I am warm blooded, and I fear the consequences of lack of respect. Things have changed. Respect is no longer the same. The Hafsia of the 90s was more frightening than nowadays, but at the time a* Oueld houma *who lacked respect to a passer-by was called to order by the "chief of the district". Like the Qouroun (centuries) family that owes its name to the longevity of "working" family members. Today you've got kids who can use a knife for nothing. It can degenerate quickly"*. (Y., male, 30, liberal profession, souks district)

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32   For this religious man performing as imam in a district oratory, robberies in mosques are a fatal novelty:
        "*Since the revolution, even mosques are no longer spared by robberies [...] A thief of shoes had been caught in the El Grana mosque [located in the souk of the same name] someone had discovered him with plastic bags filled with shoes. A citizen has beaten the hell out of him »*.

This change in the code of honour of the district chief, as evidenced by many respondents, also appears in the perception of the security forces who testify of the diversity of offenses and of the way they are redundant in some families. Thus, the code of honour that makes district thugs the protectors of traders who settled there seems to have been distorted in recent years by young people who, in search of drugs, attack the first victims at hand namely, businesses in their own district; this was unthinkable in the past. So "*today,* ouled el houma *can rob each other, which did not happen before. For example, if one of them owns a shop, a stall,* ouled el houma *can rob the shop to get by. In which case, no complaint is filed. The question is settled directly between the boys of the district*" (Y., male, 30's, liberal profession, souks district).

Ambiguous relationships

Communication with the local security services, like the police station or chief district, also includes exchanges and random meetings with public security officers patrolling during the day in certain areas of the Medina. The impact of relationships maintained at a personal level on the quality of the security provided makes the role of the police force look vulnerable and not constant.

Thus, according to W., female, 30s, activist in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz: "*It's very personal. The chief of this police station [Djemaa Zitouna street] is very good and he helps us. You come in the afternoon you find another officer who gives you his number and asks you to call him in case of trouble. Once, the tourist police intervened while they do not deal with this kind of business! They had to intervene and contact their Bab Souika colleagues. Personal relationships ... everything is personal*".

In this testimony, it is also difficult to seek police action in terms of protection and prevention. The absence of a legal system translated into practical procedures, leaves the action to be undertaken to the discretion of the solicited officers: "*Among the policemen, there are good people and there are others. If the policeman is a good person, he will secure your safety, in other cases he will do nothing. In general, we cannot trust the security forces in their way of handling violence cases*" (W., female, 30, community leader in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz).

Relationships differ according to who you are dealing with. According to N., female, 30's, community leader in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz, at the local police station local residents can get support and establish relationships of trust: "*when a beneficiary [of the services of an NGO supporting vulnerable women] complains to the police station and she mentions that she lives there, her complaint is more listened to and taken into account than that of an outsider*". Does the fact that the police are aware that an association defends these women affects their way of considering complaints?

For this interviewee, relations with Bab Bhar police (it is in fact the fixed patrol of the public security located at Place de la Victoire, composed of a dozen uniformed officers) are negatively perceived. Their treatment of beneficiaries of *the services of the NGO supporting vulnerable women* is, according to them, administrative harassment; they ask them daily to show their identity cards although they generally recognize them. The quality of harassment attributed to this verification of identity - simple and legal in its content but annoying when it becomes repetitive - is more a formality than checking for purpose. Thus, according to W., female, 30's, member of the same association, the insinuations made by the policemen on the women's place of residence, supposed, according to them, to receive women "free" and without ties, and the repeated checks of identity, even though these women are known to be residents of the center, are perceived as acts of violence by these women in vulnerable situations:

"*One day, a resident came to me and told me that a police officer asked her "when are you going to find us a woman? "You are single mothers, when will you find us a woman "I went to see him, this policeman, and he knows me by sight because they have known us for some time. [...] I told him: "What you are doing has a name, it is harassment and violence and if you do not respect your obligations, we will report you to the Minister of the Interior ". Since that time, we have not had to deal with him again. "*

Although the perception of community police is better, their role is limited in terms of availability and of their ability to intervene in case of emergency. Usually, the mobilization of the police is dependent on the personal relationships with the commanders in chief and the police officers with authority. The result of such a heavy impact of interpersonal relationships on the quality of public services is crucial.

« *The police are present in sufficient number during the day but disappear at night. From our experience here, the police did not move until I called them personally after the president of the association had tied relations with the chief of the station. Everything is based on the relationships we have. I call someone [the police] and they answer my request to avoid blame from their boss. One night, when the station was closed [and we needed the police], the tourist police intervened, and when we called the 197 number, they did not come and asked me to call the Kasbah police station. When you call the Kasbah station, if they are not informed of our call by another policeman, they do not come." (*N., female, 30, community activist in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz*).*

Between district chiefs and community support, the art of an alternative security solution?

Monopolizing the legitimate force[33], the Tunisian State, under Ben Ali regime, imposed its power over the internal security forces in terms of territorial and citizens control without ever sharing any prerogative with secondary operators of the system such as private security companies. After the events of January 2011, and the outbreak of insurgencies throughout the country, security forces withdrew for several days from Tunis districts, leaving to the army the management of domestic security in a country under an emergency state. The security vacuum led to the emergence of groups of local citizens from the districts organizing surveillance rounds, controlling access to different areas of the city. The Medina followed this dynamic of taking common security in charge, which became the business of the locals. Before that, community forms of security were more concerned with the souks where traders organized themselves to call in guards watching over their shops in the evening; a practice which is disappearing since these shopkeepers started using closed-circuit television systems. After the gradual return of the internal security forces to their premises, the advent of Ennahdha party at the head of a coalition power and its takeover of the Ministry of the Interior, overturned the security system and the question of the plurality of security actors, or even "parallel security", became a subject of political debate. This led to a loss of public confidence in the police's ability to face certain threats, mainly by those Salafist groups, in a context where Salafists were not yet officially considered to be a threat to security[34].

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33   "Like all the political groups that preceded it historically, the state consists of a relationship of domi-
       nance by man over man based on legitimate violence. "In WEBER Max, *Le savant et le politique* (1919),
       Paris, Union Générale d'Éditions, 1963, 186 pages, p. 87 of the on-line edition. Collection: Le Monde in
       10-18.

34   For example, extremist preacher Bashir Ben Hassen held a conference on 17 November 2012 at Car-
       thage Palace and appeared with Mr Marzouki during the 2014 presidential campaign.

As a result, local actors, mainly from the community sector, turned to other security providers: "*In 2012, Dream City was launched after the attack on the US embassy, and we feared for our safety and that of the artists. So, we decided to set up a system of protection for artists by the district chiefs; we felt that it was not possible to trust a police force under an Ennahdha government."* (B., female, 50's, association executive in the district of El Maktar)

According to N., male, 60's, elder of the district, respected and recognized by all, not for his physical strength nor his capacity to harm, but for the territorial and social anchoring that he embodies, seems to have faded away since the revolution: *"There was a fight one day and 'am Habib [old and respected man from the district] came out. The person behind the fight threw his knife and ran away. Three days later, he ['am Habib] stopped him: "did your father act like that? "What has become of us*? *He would feel insulted"*.

This elders' intervention is complemented by that of the district chief, making "law" prevail, his law, in a district that serves as a basis for his various activities. Considered as a crusader among his family, he maintains order and protects the property and the people of the district. "*There were mobsters in the district of Djerbiens, but well brought up anyway. They moved them out [...] Before, in the 60s and 70s we went through the district of Djerbiens without being disturbed, today we are afraid "* (N., male, 60's).

The relationship with the district is very deep as stated in many testimonies who confirm what was observed in other districts in the outskirts of Tunis although having neither the history nor the territorial and urban particularities of the Medina. The revolution episode and the challenges the inhabitants had in terms of security was expressed in different interviews. It reinforced the feeling of responsibility felt by young people, inherent to their status of *ouled el houma*: "*There was no police [period of the revolution] ... We even watched over the shops on Sabbaghine Street "*(A., male, 20, unemployed, El Makter district); This observation is in line with Ridha Ben Amor's (Ben Amor 2015: 34): "*Despite the discredit that strikes it, partly internalized by young people, the district is far from being a place of reclusion, and social bonds there are strong*"without being a "community of destiny"shared by these families long before they settled in this district.So, for M, male, 25 years old, unemployed, El Maktar district, "*Your district is your home [Dar, this term also refers to the family]. Someone who denigrates your district insults you and insults your home. "* But the district in question nourishes a certain historical conscience and a feeling of pride owing to the rich history of the place and the prestigious buildings frequently visited: "*History is Torbet el Bey*" (M., male, 25) to which G., male, 20, unemployed, district of El Maktar, adds: *"About a thousand beys are buried there! "*

Similarly, the chief can order the suspension of robbery acts during a fixed period. This was the case during Dream Festival where the slogan was "*no one should be harmed, no evil should occur*" and according to F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district, *"nothing [no aggression, no incident] happen*ed"

What was mentioned in the interview was to let the police out of all this and to rely on the naughty boys of the district to solve the problems. This is the tacit recognition of their sovereignty over their territory: "*We solve every problem in this area which is the police responsibility (*enfodhdhou*) [...] We will find the means (*netçarrfou*) we just have to warn them, we,* ouled el Houma, *before [the police] "*(F., male, 25).

Apart from the district chiefs, some known and recognized residents also contribute in solving problems of aggression and violence for which the police do not bother and do not wish to intervene: "*The person who protects us the most here it is our neighbor more than the police. One day one of our residents was abused, it was he who intervened. We did call the police, but no one came".* (N., female, community association leader in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz)

This reality was perceived by one of the founders of an *NGO supporting vulnerable women* who made sure, before it opened, to establish relations with the district inhabitants. And the protection by the district chiefs, mentioned above, can be perceived as one of the positive results: "*It is thanks to these relations [established with the inhabitants of the district] that we did not have any problems with our close neighbours after the opening ... If the founder had not taken the trouble to establish these relationships, we would have been victims of violence"* (W, female, 30, association centre in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz).

From neighbourhood 'El Houma' to area 'Kârou'

Together with the term district (*houma*), appears the use of area (kârou) which describes an area of influence including several districts. That of El Maktar's youth includes the southern half of the central Medina bordered by the boulevards within the ancient walls of the central Medina and Djemaa Zitouna Street as the northern border. "*Sabkha Street is a separate district, Bab el Fella is another, then Bab Menara. These are the districts, but everything is interconnected. Bab Djedid has about 5 areas! We (El Maktar), Sebkha Street, Bab el Fella, Rased-Darb and Bab Menara. Each group is under one district. We have our friends in other places and we visit them, but we do not behave like here* "(F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district). The term area (Karou), which seems to have been used here for the first time, therefore, refers to a space encompassing the district of origin, including the houma in its broadest understanding (houmet Bab Djedid of which El Makter would be one of five units) and where the influence of young people and their ability to agree with those of other bands in action gives them a real and effective authority even if their usual field of action is smaller. The young people of the area are alone entitled, according to the code of honour of the districts, to use their power and influence to commit offenses, but also to solve problems which they, indeed, contributed to create. Control, regulation, monopoly of infringements and legitimacy of actions are their attributes. F., male, 25, living in El Maktar, interprets as an assault the fact that acts of delinquency are committed by others not belonging to the area under his influence "*This area is ours; it belongs to us. If strangers commit offenses here, it means that they have outraged us (t'addaoualina) "*.

Salafist Violence

The red-light district, one of the last two of Tunis, located at Sidi Abdallah Guech Street[35], a public street not subject to a special status despite the specialization and strict supervision of the main activity there, was victim of the first Salafist attacks of the district. It was on 8 February 2011, just three weeks after the ousted President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali left the country. Residents were victims of attacks aimed at destroying the premises and wallowing others, and they were only saved by the security forces[36]. Strictly regulated and controlled, the activity of prostitution is confined to brothels.

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35   Name of a saint whose shrine was an asylum for people wanted by the state. Prostitutes have gradually settled around to take refuge in case of intervention by the security forces invoking the right of asylum granted to the place.

36   DAHMANI F., "Prostitution : islamistes et maisons closes, le blues des filles de joie tunisiennes », *Jeune Afrique*, April 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/133742/societe/prostitution-islamistes-et-maisons-closes-le-blues-des-filles-de-joie-tunisiennes/

Map 3: *Limits of Houma and Kârou*

The Ministry of the Interior identifies sex workers as workers and imposes a biweekly medical control[37] on them and grants them the status of Ministry employees as a profession on their identity card.

The testimony of the owner of one of the houses on the street reports cases of serious violence, some assailants sprayed the doors of the closed houses with gasoline and tried to set them on fire[38]. She says she owes her rescue to the intervention of neighbours who prevented the demonstrators from entering the street until the arrival of the security forces who blocked the entrances with the help of the army[39] by blocking all access ways before dispersing the demonstrators. Salafist pressure and harassment was on a daily basis, deterring potential customers from accessing the premises and closely monitoring access to the district. Police protection greatly decreased, the officers did not want to perform routine rounds in the area. Even the neighbours changed their attitude; tolerant in the beginning, many of them now wish the closing of brothels.[40]

Since then there have been other violence manifestations by Salafists. This can be expressed by a simple refusal to serve European visitors of the old town and even its users: *"The only time I was affected was in 2012 when the Salafists, keeping the shop next to me, once announced that they would not serve me anymore. There was nothing more, it was done without aggression"*.
(B., female, 50's, community leader in El Maktar district)

Violence can also be expressed by verbal vexations and aggression affecting, as in the following case, artists visiting the district of Kherba: *"we were waiting for artists when an orange-bearded Salafist came to insult us and spit on us, but nothing more. It was in 2012*. (E., female, 30's community activist in El Maktar district)

Violence committed by active Salafist groups after 2011 can also be physical and affect people's integrity. They are the result of former offenders, known to the police for various crimes, reconverted an recruited after 2011 by the Salafist movement. According to one of the police officers with whom we had informal talks, *"the former offenders make up 80% of the contingent of Salafists raging in the Medina"*.

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37 In Tunis, the health centre receives every day nearly 50 prostitutes out of a total of 238 prostitutes officially reportred "in BENSAID I.« Les islamistess'attaquent aux maisons closes », France 24, March 23, 2011, http://www.france24.com/fr/20110318-prostituees-tunis-tunisie-prostitution-bordel-avenue-bourguiba-mosquee-islamistes

38 HAMMOUCHE A., "News report in the heart of the red district of Tunis. Prostitute of Sidi-Abdallah-Guech ", La Liberté http://www.swisspressaward.ch/fr/user/a00003590/section/swiss-press-photo/,

39 *Agence France Presse* flash news, reproduced by *Jeune Afrique* under the headline "Tunis: Islamists try to burn down a street where prostitutes work", 18 February 2011.http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/76056/politique/tunis-des-islamistes-tentent-dincendier-une-rue-ou-travaillent-des-prostituees/

40 This tendency is not unique to Tunis, most of the reserved areas have closed their doors, only two are still open. The state seems to be trying to close them, no permission for new occupants is given.See.http://nawaat.org/portail/2017/11/24/%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D %D 8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B4%D9%91-%D8%A7% D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84/

In the first years after the fall of the dictatorship, Salafists took advantage of a favourable environment, benefiting on one hand from the significant decline in police action following the fall of Ben Ali regime and the on the other hand of a tolerant political context especially since the Islamist party Ennahdha formed, with two other parties, a coalition government: The Troika. As a result, there has been a proliferation of acts of aggression, intimidation and control of the informal market by Salafist groups, even after the incident of the US embassy attack[41]. The situation has changed slightly since the last year of the Troika's government, notably through increased control over Salafists. Indeed, members of these movements complain of being always subject to administrative control after having been sentenced to imprisonment and released. This is the so-called "registry signing" procedure at the police station with the necessary territorial jurisdiction.

This procedure, contrary to the law, has however been abolished and the administrative control only remains for those involved in drug trafficking cases who have suffered a heavy sentence of imprisonment (this is an additional sanction ordered by the judge). However, as mentioned above, 80% of Salafist members come from the delinquency and crime population (with various crimes to their credit such as: outrages on the public road, violence, robberies, drug trafficking), they may be de facto affected by the additional penalty for the above-mentioned offenses and not because of their belonging to Salafist movements. Salafist networks are particularly visible and active in Kherba, Hafsia and Boumendil. But these places are precisely those which suffer most from the weak presence of security forces that can only intervene with reinforced support. These low quotas can also be explained by the existence and of a reinforced system set up to protect state institutions and personalities to the detriment of the management of small and medium-size crimes. Through the testimonies collected, their presence differs according to the activities. From legal trade, such as thrift stores in Hafsia, to deploying a strong presence to supervise the young people in the district selling sports and leisure items using informal trade: sale on public stalls without licence, in El Kherba.

"*During Ramadan, around 10 pm; with an artist friend from Benin and another friend, we decided to film a hopscotch in the district, at the crossing Attarine-Blaghjiyya. A few people coming out of the Zitouna mosque after the prayer, led by a former dealer in the district, the fifties, reconverted into Salafism, with henna beard, asked us violently not to film them. We asked him to speak calmly with respect. The group retraced their steps to join the leader; another gangster in the group scolded me and hit me on the shoulder. I started to hit everybody madly ... I called to my rescue the* ouled el houma *who were in their usual place at Seyida Ajoula street (Souks district). When they saw me in this state, they understood that I didn't do anything wrong. I have never hit anyone without a valid reason. This aggressor, now sought by* ouled el houma*, will have to move to Sabbaghine and leave the house he rented at impasse Bouhachem, near the respondent's house* (Y, male, 30, liberal profession, souks district) *to avoid retaliation".*

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41   The attack on the US embassy by hundreds of Islamists and a few dozen thugs took place on 14 September 2012. It revealed the disorganization of the security services and the difficulties of co-ordination between the Defence and the Interior. The attack was expected by the US Embassy in Tunis, particularly after the September 11th assassination of US Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and his three employees in Benghazi, whose senior official had asked for reinforcements and increased protection of the Chancery and the American School of Tunis. See: WESLATY L., "Attack of the American Embassy in Tunis: Four dead, zero responsible", Nawaat, 26 September, 2012, http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/09/26/attaque-de-lambassade-us-a-tunis-quatre-morts-zero-responsa-ble// & BELLAMINE Y., "After Zbidi and Laârayedh: General Rachid Ammar and Touhami Abdouli deny Marzouki's version of the US embassy attack in 2012", Huffington Post Maghreb, July 27, 2017, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/07/27/rachid-ammar-moncef-marzo_n_17598046.html

Salafist control was also reflected in the interference with religious rites. Thus, in an oratory (Khutbah) in the souk of Sidi Mahrez, their presence, visible at their way of dressing, very different from traditional Tunisian men's wear, quickly resulted in insistent requests to suppress the oratory practices instituted "*from time immemorial*" according to a craftsman visiting the oratory in question, (N., male, 60, Hafsia district) who added " *they insisted that the reading of the fâtiha be suppressed after each prayer, as well as the prayers that followed. I had to comply to avoid dividing the local practitioners' community*".

Violence between districts - violence in everyday life

The issue of violence between districts recurs repeatedly in interviews; as much by its spectacular aspect as by the brutality of its expression. The territorial application of this violence raises many questions. First, the choice of the fighting site: it must be neutral. Two bands of one district will rarely face each other on their territory but choose instead a third district that will bear the brunt of the confrontation and is either a buffer zone, an intermediate district between the other two, or a district chosen as a confrontation location for its spatial qualities allowing easy deployment and escape.

These rivalries between districts and their consequences appear in many interviews, without necessarily emerging as a direct observation of the events nor as an experimentation of the violence which is the corollary. For A., male, 30, liberal profession, district of the souks: " *I know the fights that take place between young people from other districts who find themselves there on neutral ground to face each other. I once hid in a cafe waiting for the fight to calm down and the owner of the cafe asked a waiter to escort me out* ". B, male, active association member, reminded that "*last year, one of these groups came out in the neighbourhood, and a young man died during the confrontation, but this does not happen all the time*". He also insisted during the interview that he did not often witness such events. As for B., female, 50's, community leader in the El Maktar district, she believes that "*there are a lot of divisions and rivalries between districts. Even with districts that can be far away. It's very clannish, there are physical boundaries that they [young people] cannot go beyond.* "

The question of identifying with the territory and of population balance is worth exploring more closely. Thus, in the district of El Maktar "*the denial of the source of violence is made by accusing the shopkeepers of El Kherba used as scapegoats, not originating from the Medina. They are accused of harassing their mothers and sisters and for polluting the place with waste (packaging, plastic bags ...) while they themselves had come only recently to live in the Medina. But for the young people, the* Jlema *(from the city of Jelma, a small town in the centre of Tunisia attached to the province of Sidi Bouzid with less than 6,000 inhabitants in 2014), they are foreigners, newcomers*" (B., male, 30's, activist in the district of El Maktar). This testimony demonstrates the fact that generating pollution in public spaces is perceived as violence. It also highlights the strength of young people's sense of belonging to their district, even though they come mostly from recent rural migration.

Code of honour and community spirit

The community spirit that animates young people from the same district is one of the pillars of the code of honour they obey. "*When one of the* ouled el houma *is attacked, we all go there. Hitting one of us means despising us all.* (A., male, 20, unemployed, El Maktar district). Direct involvement seems to be mainly by the unemployed and non-educated youth; their peers, students and graduates of higher education are more inclined to observe district conflicts without getting involved.

*"There was a problem once. One guy hit another who wanted to return the aggression that night. My district and the other one is separated by Seiyda Ajoula Street. Most fights are like that, between districts. It starts at the café "salam" and here we go ... You hear dirty words, cries of pain and broken glass. Whoever flees will see his district devastated, doors, windows [...] for two days for two days no one shows up ... We solve this between us. No big chiefs of the district, nor the police nor anything at all. "(M, male, 24, student, district of Souk el Blat)" Our district is safe. The Medina is safe. But when there are problems between our district and another, it is no longer. When you are in conflict with the neighbouring district, as soon as you catch one, you hit him! It lasts a week, 10 days then we are all in jail where we reconcile. After a while, it starts again". (*F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district).

Young people's identification with their own district is not a characteristic of the Medina only, it can be observed in other peripheral districts of Tunis where the importance of territorial anchoring involves even new residents. (Lamloum, 2015). This territorial anchoring is added to the dynamics of local solidarity woven by sharing a space and a way of life. It adds to the notion of refuge-city. It is an additional aspect of the mobilization of the young people of a given area for the other residents, whatever the relationship between the people. It is based on the simple belonging to a common area and on the community, spirit resulting from it.

Family violence

 "*The balance of power between the different groups and different age groups, often generates violence*". This assertion by B., male, 30, activist in Hafsia, could seem trivial if it was not supported by the latest survey conducted by ASM. It reveals that 25.6% of respondents reported having experienced physical violence during the last 12 months preceding the survey, boys being more affected than girls. This violence involved corporal punishment[42] and hard relationships with parents. Violence against family members, mainly parents by their children and vice versa, is a common crime in the Medina. These relationships reflect difficult family situations.For example, in El Maktar district, with its highest number of *oukelas* (local authorities' assessment provided in the absence of statistics), as in Hafsia district, the balance of power between the different age groups results into violence. This is what B., male, 30's, activist in Hafsia notes: "*Violence is part of the daily life of Hafsia. Itis reflected in inter-generation relationships. The older has the right to beat the younger; it is played between children and teens and between teens and parents / grandparents who easily express this violence, verbally to begin with*".

The interviewed association members noted the low parent involvement in their children's life and growth: "*Many parents are disinterested; many have never come here; most of the children who come here never come with their parents. This is part of the street life. We note this lack of interest of many parents for what their children do.* " (B, male, 30, community activist, Hafsia).

Legitimizing violence seems to be rooted in the conception of social relations. Thus for N, male, 60: "*With these people, only the use of the stick works! It's the stick that educates."*

Damaging the environment

If we assume that the state of the buildings in a district has a definite influence on the residents, then the reaction of the young people of El Maktar to the state of their district is not surprising. A simple walk in the streets perpendicular to El Maktar street is enough to realize the extent of the problems which the district faces.

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42   It should be noted that many of the young people encountered showed signs of self-harm. But this did not show in a specific questionnaire. See (BEN ABDALLAH Sénim, 2017, p 56).

Dilapidated facades, degraded buildings, many collapsed buildings replaced by locations not existing on the map, neglected by a weakened and obsolete local authority. Random playgrounds at certain times of the day, metamorphosed into open dumps, illegal bars at night, receptacle of an invisible population that appears only at times agreed on by an unspoken understanding, splitting the day in time slots for the use by each sub-community; an understanding with the force of law, an unwritten law that has become a habit. The main square, when it exists, takes the form of a theatre stage where residents expose themselves according to their status at particular hours and in certain postures reflecting their position in the local society.

"*This district [El Maktar, perceived as such by the young, leads to El Kherba and is bordered by Torbet el Bey. This square of El Maktar is the centre of their district and its use is highly codified: time slots are associated with groups of residents. Young people, therefore, consider that the place is theirs at certain agreed times of the day but not at others".* (B., female, 50's, community leader in El Maktar district)

Torbet el Bey is the street where they would roam, walk and take drugs in the evening. The choice of this place, on the district border, is not surprising when we understand that the district is also the site where the more powerful would exhibit their power, to harm and command the younger, where however, extreme practices such as the inoculation of narcotics are banned. The *El Maktar Square (Bathat El Maktar)* is not likely to be used as a stage where an artistic performance would be played in which the district chiefs are the main actors. This exposure would make them lose their status. In addition, *El Maktar Square* cannot be used in the morning since a new restaurant has opened. As to children, they meet to play in the little square opposite *Dar Othman*.

Adjoining the district of *Torbet el Bey*, a location repeatedly mentioned in interviews about the violence that is committed there, *El Makta*r has always been neglected, which is all the more unbearable when compared to its dreaded neighbour to the west benefiting from renovation and embellishment works.

To express this frustration, one of the young men straddles over an imaginary line, symbolizing the demarcation between the abandoned and littered district of *El Maktar* and that of *Torbet el Bey*, whose two axes have benefited from major renovation works and was made famous by the soap opera "*Nsibti Laaziza*".*"On this side, I am G. the good guy and, passing on the other side, I am G. the villain"* holding a long knife taken out of his pocket. As a direct consequence, the state of cleanliness of the Medina, this devaluation of the living space and the frustration it generates, seem to remain unchanged forever. Unable to find the material and human resources to maintain the place in a satisfactory clean state, the municipality can only count on a few under-equipped cleaners (no gloves, rudimentary equipment, routes too long to clean) and deployed on areas they cannot entirely cover, so they only deal with the main axes and tourist circuits. To alleviate this situation *"the young people may steal the tractor from the municipality to clean the place [El Maktar] and return it later"*. (E., female, 30's, association leader in the district of El Maktar)

This second phase of renovation and embellishment of the district El Andalus stopped at the border of this district, so the young people in the other districts developed a strong feeling of bitterness and interpreted this choice as a municipal desire to denigrate their district and its inhabitants.

"Do you know what they did, those safeguarding the Medina [Association]? They divided the Medina in two. One half paved and the other half, the lower part, not paved, dirty and unlit. The upper half [Andalous street, where was turned the series "Nsibti Laaziaa", Pasha street, Kasbah street ...] [...] clean walls, new lighting, you would think you are in Sidi Bou Saïd [...]. The street of El Andalus district, where they did the shooting of "Nsibti Laaziaa" [El Andalus street, Pasha street, Kasbah street ... they restored these places and left us like that in dust and mud [...]. The others [the residents of the upper part], they [the ASM team] consider it a chic place and pay special attention to it (hasbinhom). We are 5 meters away from each other and we belong to the same district, but they separated us". (F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district)

The consequences in terms of practice and uses are not surprising. Unlit, poorly maintained, with squares formed out of ruins, the place loses its attractiveness and is perceived as dangerous by B., female, 50's, association leader in the district of El Maktar. "*It is the case of the sabbât [vaulted passage] of the district also (Sabbaghine); everything is black, dirt, puddles ... all this contributes to make the place unpleasant, especially at night.*" The first victims of this degradation are the residents themselves who suffer from the negative image of their district*: "Everyone talks negatively about the Medina without knowing it. You come to the Medina without knowing it, you see dead ends, holes, ruined houses, poor public lighting. "*(Male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district)

This district is perceived as a space of uncivility, the deterioration of the few existing elements of urban development, the dirt, the degradation of the walkways, contribute to identify it to a place where uncivil acts can be committed because these observations reveal "*possible chaos, loss of meaning and self-confidence and other things".[43]*

School violence

A historical and administrative heart of the city of Tunis, the Medina receives many young people from surrounding districts including from many so called difficult districts and old slums regularized gradually by the authorities. For children from disadvantaged social classes, the possibility of being confronted with violence and humiliation is a real issue. This qualitative study does not provide precise statistics on this problem.[44] Nevertheless, the testimonies collected from the young people surveyed demonstrate to what extent this question remains relevant and has marked them. "*School violence is recurrent in all our talks with the population"* as asserted by B., female, 50's, community leader in the El Maktar district. For Y., male, 30's, living in the souks district: "*I remember an incident that I will never forget; two young students, in the middle of winter, arrived late for class at Sadiki Primary School. A girl and a boy. The teacher beat their feet so hard, in front of a class of 37 children in the 3rd year of primary school, that blood spurted from the girl's feet, I remember that the toes were showing through holes in their socks; the poor kids were in a miserable situation.*" Other cases are mentioned, like that of "*a young man named Ayoub, always top of his class. The teachers were afraid of him because he came from the Hayy Hlal district [underprivileged suburb of the capital]. He left school to help his family (dārhom). The state destroyed him by giving him a job for 400 dinars. He could have become a doctor. Instead of sending social assistance, check why he was not coming [to class] "*(male, 24, student, Sabbaghine district).

Because of the difficulty of living in poverty and not being able to afford basic school needs, some children are object of scorn and will suffer from exclusion reproduced within the school. "*The school also plays a role in the exclusion of children.*

43   DEBARBIEUX Éric, "Insecurity and violence at school", Informationssociales, No. 62, 1997, File: Young people in cities: how to live?

44   For more details on school violence, see (Payet, 2006).

We were faced with the case of a child excluded from extra-curriculum activities because his father was selling alcohol and he was blacklisted in front of his classmates by the teacher. "
(E., female, 30's, association leader in the district of El Maktar).

It would seem that children are judged according to their parents' situation remaining, thus, prisoners of their birth conditions and their environment. "*This is unfortunately the case in many schools, we are told these children are hopeless, they are despised and marginalized from early age.* (B., female, 50, community leader in El Maktar district). Young people leave school because parents cannot afford their schooling burden. These young people are later recovered by the street, its hazards and its environment of violence. Precariousness also decreases the chances of success in school, no possibility for an outstanding young student to succeed if he is not helped; but the poorest are not assisted and, according to this same interviewee, "*the teaching profession applies all the cleavages of society in the school! The school accentuates divisions and blames students in front of strangers [...] we deplore the teachers' lack of respect and compassion".*

In fact, this violence is part of the wider context bullying inflictions[45] on children at school and can be classified into three types: physical bullying resulting in the violation of the physical integrity of the victim (assault); verbal bullying resulting in the violation of the moral integrity of the victim (insults); and emotional bullying resulting in the exclusion from the group (ostracism). In all cases, the perpetrators intentions is the humiliation or intimidation of the victim. The fact that members of the faculty and administration are involved in this process deserves a better attention. It is necessary to explore their own feelings about their missions and difficulties encountered as well as the consequences on their relationship with the students in these so called difficult areas[46]. This violence by teachers, comes in various forms: humiliations, ostracism, racist remarks, reference to the social origins or social status of the parents, are all manifestations of violence that deeply affects the students.

To the question of what could improve the security situation in the Medina, M., male, 24, student, collaborating with various associations, district of Souk el Blat, answers: "*Everything is related to education, not to health, (we are used to grandmother' remedies), nor to politics, of which we couldn't care less ... Here, nobody aspires to become minister or president, they aspire to a salary that's all* ».

According to different readings by Meirieu (1997), these testimonies reflect a loss of the values of school culture whose primary mission is to train citizens by training students in civility by transmitting a *"common culture capable of illuminating the world* "(Vuille 1999).

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45   Here is Emmanuel Peignard's definition: "We say that a child or a young person is being bullied or being quarreled ... when another child or young person, or a group of children or young people tell him nasty or unpleasant things. It is also bullying when a child or a young person is beaten or kicked, threatened, locked in a room, receives wicked letters or notes, when no one speaks to them, and things like that. These things happen often and it is difficult for the children or the young people who are bullied to defend themselves. It is also bullying when a child or a young person is regularly teased in a mean way. But this is not bullying when two children or young people of about the same strength fight or argue exceptionally or for the first time "(PEIGNARD 1998).

46   According to E., female, 30s, anactivist in El Maktar district, *"principals at Kotteb Louzir (El Khirba) and El Marrschools seem to be in deep depression. It is like a nightmare for them."*

However, in a local context of tensions, of stigmatizing students from disadvantaged social conditions, and in a framework that favours competitiveness and competition (the school remains the main means of social promotion), this phenomenon proves to be particularly complex. Since the priority of the education system is no longer to train citizens, teachers "*do not teach you to live in society. You kill a man in front of a clinic, do not expect a stretcher to take him away, "* (H., male, 20's, student, lives El Hajjamine and frequent visitor of El Maktar).

Codes and means for neutralizing violence

All the testimonies collected agree on the importance of greetings as an element of neutralization when crossing places occupied by groups perceived as hostile. While a variety of terms is available, the term "*Salam*" appears to be the magic key to safely cross risky roundabouts. It can be pronounced in a dry and firm manner, without ever looking in the eyes, with the assurance of a high level *oueld houma*, recognizing first hand all the young people of the district and being recognized by them (case of A., man, thirty years). Or in a friendly way by a young woman visiting the district because she works there, recognized by all but without particular attachment with the inhabitants (case of W., female, 30's, association leader in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz). She thinks that:

"They [the inhabitants of the district] will learn to recognize my face and will not bother us, neither the girls nor me"). For Y., male, 30, liberal profession, district of the souks, "*the way of saying*" salam alikom *"changes even according to the district. It gives enough information about the speaker's status - not to be exceeded".* Is it simply a proof of civility falling within "*the set of attitudes which consist in taking the other into consideration, providing him with proof of his social usefulness" (Debarbieux 1997).*

The question is worth asking as victims of assault and robbery are generally individuals from outside the district and showing signs of well-being making them the ideal prey.

For B., female, 50's, community leader in El Maktar district:

"*the way to pronounce "Salam" with these few letters can be the magic key to enter a district and can vary from district to another "and proceeds from "methods to neutralize somehow a violent atmosphere... It is enough to say "Salâm' alaikom", they will answer you "wa'alaykomas-Salam", and that's it ... you are safe".* (Z, male, 50's, community leader in the district of Hafsia)

According to the same interviewee, *"to be safe" and to cross areas where young people from the district are grouped depends on mastering "the codes, the little things that you avoid and things like that".*

3.6 Mobility and security in the medina

The analysis of mobility-security reports about the Medina in Tunis focuses on the definition of the interactions between the particular system of mobility in the Medina and the perceptions of insecurity as well as their impact on inhabitants' practices.

A pedestrian city where "everything is close" and where walking is the only choice.

The analysis of the mobility / security relationship in the Medina of Tunis is based on considering the dual territorial scale relationship between these two notions. Regarding the micro scale, the Medina area is a multifunctional site where it is possible to reach on foot most of the urban facilities thus producing a space with easy accessibility and smooth mobility well perceived by locals and traders, men and women. For D., female, 35, without profession, living in an *Oukala*at*Tourbet el Bey*: *"Everything is close, you do not need any means of transportation, I do all my shopping / business on foot*. This is confirmed by R, male, 40's, employee: "*I live and work in the Medina of Tunis, so all my movements are on foot"*; "*Of course I take the train to get there and it takes me more than an hour to arrive, but I feel good here, everything is close "*(W., male, 30, trader, El Maktar).

This situation, with its undeniable advantages, recurrently highlighted by the people surveyed, living and working there, raises the question of the constraints that this mode of mobility imposes in terms of physical abilities and of the perception of the public space.

Indeed, the predominantly pedestrian and multifunctional city implies walking as the only way to reach any internal destination. Except for some areas where cars still circulate - not without difficulty - walking remains the essential means. To be in the obligation to walk on foot is to expose oneself to the public space of the road and its hazards without any form of protection from transportation vehicles. All travel requires exposure to the public space and "confinement" in modes of transportation separated from the outside space, as in the case of car drivers, is irrelevant there. This mandatory exposure to the public space and its hazards is combined with the urban morphology of the Medina where residential and commercial units are intertwined, forcing any type of movement through the busy areas. Pedestrian alleys are thus confronted to the activity characteristic of daily life and the use of commercial places. The features of these alleys and their use are likely to condition users' perception and practice, as well as their safety.

The pedestrian network of the Medina, hierarchical and ramified, serves as a functional and social separation of the Medina. Although this network expresses more the connection than the separation between the different parts, each channel expresses in its arrangement and its atmosphere the function assigned to it. Walking in the Medina is following lanes that articulate sections with variable features. The characteristics of the same area- in terms of lighting, cleanliness, occupancy, activity and pedestrian density also vary with time, day and season. This complexity is likely to guide users' perceptions of practice and security

Knowledge of space and perception of insecurity

The knowledge of space seems to be a determining factor in Medina users' perception: *"I took Bab Bhar, I took Djemaa Zitouna, slowly ... and after Sidi Ben Arous ... you see the familiar streets, the clean ones. At first it was like that. Then, little by little, I learned about shortcuts, called "qassa 'arbi", so I arrived much faster. My colleagues showed me this, and very quickly I became familiar, you see, it's very user-friendly", (*F, female, 40, executive, working in the Medina). It is at the same time knowledge of the space which offers the feeling of security while walking through.

The mobility strategy here follows a familiar way. Users with little knowledge of the city start with the main roads, the disadvantages are somehow minor (promiscuity, jostling, etc.) compared to the advantages (security conferred by the presence of many passers-by). Once the way taken is marked by a primary socialization, mainly with the small business owners, secondary roads are preferred because security is now conferred by the friendly contacts and users would then avoid the crowd of busy streets, source of inconvenience including harassment. Thus, contradictory practices are noted among people who do not know the places and regular users, locals and traders: M., female, civil servant, *"avoids empty streets,"* while S, a woman who knows the Medina well "*avoids the Souks"*, considered very dense, where 'pedestrian' pace might be slowed down.

For this reason, regular users of the Medina have a negative perception of the social dynamics, i.e the processes of residential migration pushing families to leave the Medina and settle elsewhere and attracting newcomers to settle there, knowing that to become familiar reduces the risks.
"These boys, as soon as they see a face several times, they begin to get acquainted with the guy and leave him alone". (Anonymous woman)

A mapping of local mobility guided by the perception of insecurity

The security issue has implications on mobility in the Medina. We noted that some traders and residents avoid certain districts they consider unsafe such as Torbet el Bey, El Maktar, Zarkoun, El Sabbaghine and they try not to walk through them. In general, unlit walkways are considered "unsafe" because, being less exposed, they are used for the sale and consumption of drugs and alcohol: "*To avoid problems, it is better to use the main streets only",* (W., male, 40's, shopkeeper and A, male, 30, shopkeeper). Here the distinction is not based on age or sex, but on knowing the places: the regular users, men or women, with good knowledge of Medina geography and of its other residents and shopkeepers (know others, but especially are known and recognized by others) enjoy more freedom in their movements. Even those who feel safe recommend *brayniania* (non-Medina visitors) to avoid side alleys: "*I do not have any security problems ... but visitors should be watchful while walking in the Medina*" (H., male, 37, shopkeeper)*"In fact, I feel safe all around the Medina, but there are specific times. For example, El Maktar Street, Souk el Blat ... after 6.30-7pm be careful if you pass by there! I do not walk outside my district after 7pm. It is true that everyone knows me all around the Medina but not in the same way (nafsed-daraja)*" (H., male, 20's, student).

Street lighting is also an important factor for the perception of safety. "*Girls tell me that it is the fact that there isn't enough lighting, that there are people around using drugs, or trying to rob you*" (anonymous woman). It requires users to adapt. *"When the place is lit, we see better ... Here, when you go out of dead ends [the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz], you see nothing, you only see shadows coming towards you. In Pasha street, the shadow becomes a person who you recognise. Everything becomes simpler; fear fades away together with the incitement to violence. What is an attack? If he sees you walking, surely, he will not attack you, if he sees you walking and looking frightened, he will attack you. " (*N., female, 30, community leader in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz)

Temporal variations and impact on safety and mobility

The link between mobility and security in the Medina takes its full dimension at the temporal level. At night or in the weekends, especially when the souks are either closed or completely empty, feelings of insecurity may be exacerbated. The animated spaces, secured by people's presence and the activity of shop keepers, suddenly turn into abandoned, dark, repulsive places:

"*I do not go out after 5 pm"* (B., female, 60, resident and shopkeeper at Street Dabbaghine)

"I avoid staying out late in the Medina" (I., female, 35, teacher, district Zraria).

It is also the case on Sundays during the day. In the absence of shopping activities – and the visitors they attract - the streets of the Medina are empty, poorly lit due to their narrowness and especially the dead-end lanes. The combination of these factors is likely to limit mobility on Sundays: "*it's empty, and it's scary"* (F., female resident in the souks district). Places like the souks become deserted and unsafe. Thus, for security reasons, mobility decreases in the evening, during the holidays, and in summer afternoons with morning business hours and during the month of Ramadan; the streets and the souks are then deserted.

Alternative practices to address mobility and security inconveniences

The spatial configuration and the density of the activities lead to alternative mobility to facilitate movements or reinforce security. These practices concern especially women who prefer to walk in groups as specified by M., female, civil servant in the Medina: "*I always go with a friend so that we are safer"*. For school-children, there used to be a walking pickup service on walkways accompanied by adults.

Motorbikes are also another mobility alternative. They are an independent means of transportation, moving more or less easily in the narrow ways (except those which are very busy with shopping activities and pedestrian crowds). Motorbikes can very well be parked inside the houses. But on the other hand, they are negatively perceived by other road users: *"motorbike drivers are very aggressive".* (M., female, civil servant in the Medina)

Mobility and harassment

"As a woman, I feel threatened".

This expression by a civil servant working in the Medina requires that we include the issue of violence against women in a global approach, with regards to the Medina. However, many testimonies reveal the special attention that women enjoy as companions, sisters, friends, neighbours, enjoying the protection and care given to '*bent el houma*'. This solicitude may result in a way of accepting life choices by the woman in question, including with regards to her individual liberties. For F., male, 25, unemployed, El Maktar district "*do not talk about her in my presence; that one [*bent el houma*] has had her flings (*bīhawaaliha*)! That's her business, she's a girl from my district [...] talking about her means talking about us, do you understand?"*

Similarly, a female resident and a district user, known to all, will benefit from protection by the district residents intervening to put an end to a gesture or a misplaced word. For F., female, 30, an association leader, district of Hafsia, to be a woman is "*to be the target of all remarks whether good or bad, [...] in the Medina. This kind of things were much less common than elsewhere".* And, *"once you are identified, once they know who you are in quotation marks "*bent el houma*", you are part of the district"; someone intervenes; "Stop! Shame on you. She's from our district, she is ours".*

This code of honour, which spares "bent el houma *with loose morals*", also includes protecting *ouled el houma*'s girlfriends even if they are not from the district or have recently settled. Despite the existence of a certain code of conduct or code of honour (you don't harass a girl of the district), drug use makes the distinction between a female stranger and a female resident of the tough district and they are not spared especially at night when the consumption of narcotics and alcohol increases significantly.

This was the case for A., Female, 40's, working for an association in the district of Sidi el Morjani "*They [the inhabitants] have got used to my face in this district. When it's not my face, it's my clothes. Even so, a guy came out of the grocery store after sunset and wanted to bother me. It was clear that he was not in a normal condition. If he had been, he would have recognized me and remembered me. A person living nearby saw me and apologized. He caught the other guy and said, "She is from our district (*bent houmetna*)"! "*

This code of honour, mentioned above, includes the implicit rule that the Medina is reserved for men, a typically male-dominated space, especially at night, and a space where one must know not to exceed local limits of tolerance. Thus, the LGBT community have found a haven of peace in the Medina, and many testimonies agree to make the Medina a refuge, it is necessary to recall the conditions allowing this treatment of exception. For M., male, 24, student, helping various associations, living in the district of Souk el Blat *"I tolerate them [the homosexuals]; it's something personal [sexual orientation], but it does not mean that one is allowed to come in a mini [skirt], and exhibit his body (ech-chay 'ala barra), with his hairy legs and high heels like the one I saw during the Dream City event."*

The relationship with the police is also evoked by many respondents. Lack of interest in gender-based violence or sheer lack of recognition of such violence and, consequently, the lack of specific care, appears through the testimony by W., female , 30, activist in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz about the lack of "*concern in considering violence against women*. *"Oh, she left her house and took refuge in a shelter because her husband beats her? Would it not be better for her to take care of her children?" Sometimes, the female victims become the object of investigation: "Why are you out? What is your relationship with the aggressor? The victim becomes the culprit!"* To this form of disinterest and guilt, is added, as a direct consequence, the absence of mechanisms for the protection of women, and the complexity of the personal relations established and maintained with police officers with regard the security offered to protect women.

For other respondents, police assistance is synonymous of fiction. A., female, 40's, works for an association in the district of Sidi el Morjani and laconically tells us that "*the police never did anything for me when I called them!"* According to A., this refusal to help concerns urgent interventions, as in cases of violence, or even in requesting administrative documents *"They are not even able to issue a residence certificate".*

What emerges here is the existence of violence against women governing their practices and limiting their movements and freedom reducing their opportunities to invest in public places in a social context where the interconnection between public and private is reduced because of women's limited access to employment. M., female 28, student, El Maktar district, mentions night unsafety to which all the inhabitants are exposed, but which women take on an even more dramatic dimension, as it affects their mobility.

"*My sister was coming back from el-Ghani street (*Nahj el Ghani*), she was passing by the health care centre and saw a man armed with a long sword ... if she had not known how to behave, he would have attacked her right there, you have to know how to react. In the evening, I prefer to take a longer way"*.

Daytime mobility differs from what it is like at night, which in fact becomes almost non-existent since the city is perceived as all-male from a certain time. "*I feel safe all around the Medina, but a girl is not like a boy, not at any time. I know the medina well, when I go home, I do not go through the Medina, I go through Bab Djedid. And I try to get home early and if I come home late, I have to be escorted. At certain times, people recognize you as a '*bent el houma' *but at other times they don't."* (M., female, 28, student, district of El Maktar)

This possibility of using the city at night seems to vary from one district to another. If N., female, 30's, executive, activist in associations in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz, who is not from the district does not dare go out at night with the women supported by the association, her neighbour, however, *"goes out at night. Several times, she's the one who walks with the residents in the middle of the night because she is from the district. She is known as a district resident [...] and anyone who annoys her [or touches her] will have to face her husband, the man".* Daytime violence exists too and appears mainly in the form of "symbolic violence" felt and perceived in a subtle way by W. female, 30, associative centre in the district of Sidi Ali Azzouz. *"During the day, the dynamics are different. [The Medina] becomes a space for harassment, dating… I have never heard a bad word, but I can feel their eyes on me [souks' shopkeepers] when I pass by in the district"*

While many women accommodate their schedules and mobility as part of a by-pass strategy, others use, somehow, district codes of honour and are escorted by other women known as "untouchable" or they retreat in their houses or only in neighbouring places, near the family home.

Public authorities, as it appears during the interviews, have a weak role and even contribute in some cases to aggravate the perception of insecurity (poor urban lighting, employees' behaviour towards single mothers or single women.

Youth mobility practices also vary based on location. Young people's mobility in their *houma* seems very normal, while their movement in another *houma* of the Medina or outside it, can lead to repeated police checks. The situation is even more restrictive for people with no identity documents, who become imprisoned in the Medina and the form of protection it provides. Notable differences are shown between parts of the Medina (North and South example) where mobility and security conditions vary a great deal, creating some specific "transit", "buffer" or sometimes "lawless" zones whose use is highly codified.

The question of socio-collective facilities appears also to be central to young people's relations to mobility. Several young people surveyed deplore the lack of socio-collective facilities (including for sports) in their districts (which is not the case for their parents as they pointed out). This lack of activities in their district cannot be solved by accessing activities outside their *houma* for the reasons mentioned above.

Mobility and risks

Rivalries between groups can explain the different practices and their links with the security conditions. Gang movement for fights (on neutral ground generally) or for punitive fights (following a first fight between young people from different districts) spreads strong feelings of insecurity that can last for days. Young people with motorbikes are also a source of insecurity for the population, especially because of snatching thefts.

Finally, the example of Kherba School shows the close link between conditions of mobility (and converting places into parking lots), of security and of access to public services. The attendance decline at this school has led to various uses of the adjoining area and the difficult access for cars has increased insecurity and further reduced school attendance.

Connecting inside, between ease and constraints

Access to a wider geographical area (outskirts and periphery) implies using other means of transportation - individual or collective. In this case, because the Medina is central, means of transportation to reach it are reduced compared to other movements at the periphery as stated by H., female, 28, employed, Glaciers street: "*I chose to work in the Medina because it isaconvenient, accessible space. Working in the Medina allows me to use a single means of transportation*". For these people, mobility is based on different means of transportation or on a chain of motorized trips and long walks on foot. In terms of safety, it is the collective transportation portion that is perceived as a source of insecurity in the travel chain. The Medina is an accessible space by public transportation. However, there is a big access and parking problem for cars. This problem is mainly raised by people who work but do not live there. "*I put my car in a car park next to the Ministry of Social Affairs. So, every day I walk for 10 to 15 minutes. Of course, on my way there is much aggression. "(*M., female, civil servant, Medina sector)

Parking lots are rare around the Medina, and are often subject to competition between user groups, as is the case of Hafsia: "*when I'm driving I absolutely have to park in Hafsia, I have no other alternatives. And besides it is more and more crowded [...] one does not find any parking place now. Wholesalers, traders are almost invading Hafsia now". (*Female, anonymous)

3.7. Conclusion

The field survey revealed a set of practices related to insecurity in the Medina, with variable forms and sources. The territorial factor of insecurity, shows variations according not only to space, but also to time. Beyond the spatial-temporal aspects, social relationships are important variables explaining the security conditions.

The particular territorial features of the Medina, in terms of spatial configuration, roads layout, equipment and mobility, contribute, with the social characteristics, to explain the practices identified and to guide inhabitants' and users' perception of the safety conditions.

The security practices, of both the police force and the population, are fragmented and essentially based on tacit coding and regulation, in a context where other public institutions are not always present.

4.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main results of the survey analysis are summarized here, along with the conclusions that emerge from a cross-reading of the elements identified which lead to the proposed recommendations based on the actors involved.

4.1. Recap of main findings

- *"The Medina is not less safe than any other part of the city".* This quotation, repeated several times, shows that the Medina is not perceived by its inhabitants and users as an unsafe area more exposed to violence than other districts of the capital. This perception of insecurity, however, is sometimes felt by newcomers, or remains linked to time and space. Regular and familiar users recognized by the inhabitants consider even that the social links offered may create better security conditions. The Medina is governed by a code of honour where the conception of violence varies if one is a stranger, a woman or a inhabitant. Knowledge of the encoding system - looks, greetings, walking pace – becomes, thus, a key factor for safety and a shield against violence.

- Types of reported violence show that in the Medina, there is a predominance of small and medium-size delinquency acts (snatching thefts, robberies, fights consumption and sale of drugs and alcohol) but there is no random violence. Everyday violence is rooted in the societal roots of violence and its consequences (family, environment, school, women's harassment). The investigation did not reveal any violence against public institutions. Salafist violence, was highly present in the first years after 14 January 2011, but has since 2013 been on a downward trend.

- The security mechanism lacks resources - and also approaches – for a better care. Security forces, however, are the ultimate official actor for a population who receives little attention from local authorities.

- The existence of community care distributed between the different districts and the intervention of local district chiefs outline a new security alternative.

- There is a contrast between an accessible Medina internally - even though it may be difficult for certain population groups e.g. elders - and a very limited mobility and accessibility once you leave the Medina.

- Young people in the Medina, excluded from other parts of the city and confined to under-equipped districts, find themselves subjected to violence – from family, school and police. Nevertheless, they are still key actors to guarantee security, given their responsibility in violence and delinquency, and also their role in securing urban spaces. Within this category, the unemployed and the released prisoners are the most vulnerable. The link is established between the deficit of equipment and services and young people's conditions. Youth who uses "anticipatory violence" are subject to police violence, administrative harassment and

the presumption of guilt. Youth mobility is thus constrained, facilitated inside the *houma*, but subject to a strong external control. The city of refugee thus becomes, the city of imprisonment.

- Local policies for the development of public spaces, public lighting, cleanliness, mobility and public facilities and services are also at the heart of violence and security issues in the Medina.

4.2. Recommendations

For the Municipality of Tunis:

- Preparing a program to reinforce socio-collective facilities, making them accessible, to meet inhabitants' needs, particularly young people.

- Setting up a plan of intervention on the public space, maintenance and valorization, lighting, paving, networks.

- Implementing a mobility plan in the Medina, flow management, incentives for vehicle owners to reside in the city by developing parking solutions and controlled access, creating taxi stations and priority corridors, reactivating specific bus routes, 2 and 51, along the peripheral boulevards or replacing them by other options.

- Developing social services for the municipality, with emphasis on strategic action plan focused on combatting violence, social integration, dialogue with stakeholders and employment assistance.

- Promoting nightlife in the Medina and enhancing its heritage by setting up a permanent program involving a variety of concerned parties including the inhabitants and local actors.

- These actions are likely to (i) offer better urban and social conditions in the Medina for more security of public space, (ii) offer alternative activities for young people to get them out of the vicious circle of violence and (iii) make the area more attractive for households, an essential condition for social diversity and development.

For the Police:

- Better coverage of the security system in the Medina by establishing community police stations.

- More systematic coordination between the different intervention forces, including urban security, public safety police, emergency police and tourist police, in order to harmonize the modes of intervention and avoid confusion in practice.

- Reinforcement of local practices at the qualitative and quantitative levels e.g. abusive controls, administrative harassment, and improvement of relations with the inhabitants, including support at the socio-economic, cultural and educational levels. This work can be carried out in collaboration with the sub-delegates (*omad*) assisted by social mediators from the Medina and attached to the municipality.

For the associations:

- Developing community intervention activities in association with public actors such as, police, educational, health and cultural institutions.

- Engaging the young in the knowledge and development of their districts.

- Faced with the limited presence of public institutions and the limited scope of their programs as well as their rigidity, the associations that start to be established in the Medina are likely to play a leading social role.

For DIGNITY:

- Launching a quantitative study to better inform the findings of this research.

- Develop a local community-based intervention to prevent violence and establish a dialogue platform between civil society, inhabitants, users, police and state institutions. This dialogue platform will be able to define actions to be undertaken by each of these actors.

- Developing support projects for local actors, e.g. management of public services and facilities, municipality, police, associations, by providing expertise and launching pilot projects. These actions are intended to better integrate all the factors related to safety and security.

- Monitoring violence through a system of reporting and assistance. Indeed, certain types of violence, such as GBV, do not always follow a reporting procedure and therefore remain unknown and inadequately addressed. Free legal assistance would reduce the vulnerability of the local residents, especially young people. This should also include the economic and social reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-prisoners.

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